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INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE: PRIVACY PROTECTION
FOR THE EMPLOYED
Ariana R. Levinson*
"Every legal structure has a central point on which all
individual rules rest and from which all legal emanations
proceed. In civil law, the central point is property. In
labor law, humanity."1
"Beggars can't be choosers." '2
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, Samuel Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis proclaimed that technological change necessitated new pro-
tections for the right to privacy. Today, new protections for the right to
privacy are called for once again because, in the American workplace,
technological change continues unabated and little privacy is afforded
employees from employer monitoring via such technology. Moreover,
employers are disciplining and terminating employees based on informa-
tion uncovered through monitoring. Recently, many employees have
been disciplined and terminated for activities such as off-duty blogging
and using e-mail for personal reasons while at work. Employers have
even relied on data from global positioning systems to discipline drivers
and other employees.
This is the first academic article in over thirty years to provide a
detailed review of labor arbitration decisions governing the right to pri-
vacy from employer monitoring. The Article uses the decisions on em-
ployee privacy and technologies, such as GPS, e-mail, and the Internet,
as a springboard to propose privacy protections in the non-union private
sector workplace. Thus, the Article fills a gap in the academic literature.
The framework suggested provides the greatest protection for off-duty
behavior, intermediate protection for on-duty expression of thought, such
* Assistant Professor, University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law; J.D.,
University of Michigan Law School. The author thanks Andrew Petti for his consistent sup-
port of this project.
I HUGO SINZHEIMER, DAS PROBLEM DES MENSCHEN IM REcHT (1939), reprinted in 2
HUGO SINZHEIMER, ARBE1TSRECHT UND RECHTESSOZIOLOGIE 53, 61 (Otto Kahn-Freund and
Thilo Ramm eds., 1976) (quoted and translated by Matthew W. Finkin, Menschenbild: The
Conception of the Employee as a Person in Western Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 577,
620 & n.256) (2002) ("Jede Rechtsordnung hat ein Zentrum, auf das alle Einzelregelungen
bezogen sind und von dem alle Einzelbefugnisse ausstrahlen. Dieses Zentrum ist im biirger-
lichen Recht das Eigentum, im Arbeitsrecht das Menschentum.").
2 This phrase is an American adage.
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as through computer usage, and baseline protection for on-duty actions.
It could be implemented through legislation of minimum employee pri-
vacy rights or mandates for employers to adopt safe-harbor policies.
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INTRODUCTION
Each employee is a human with private thoughts, private communi-
cations, and a private life. These remain as dear to the employee the
moment after the employee steps into the workplace as the moment
before. Yet if the employee needs the job, perhaps to pay the rent, feed
her children, maintain a residence near her elderly parents, or even main-
tain her status in the community or her sense of self, then the American
employee must, to a large extent, give up her privacy. The emergence of
new technology has exacerbated this problem by providing new means of
communication, blurring the boundary between work and private life,
and providing employers with additional means of monitoring their
employees.
Consider, for example, the case of Michael Smyth, whose employer
terminated him for sending an electronic mail message (e-mail) to his
supervisor that complained about management. 3 Despite management's
promise that e-mails were private, would not be intercepted, and would
not provide grounds for termination, the court upheld his termination. 4
In another well-known decision, Robert Konop maintained a private
website which was available only to restricted users who logged in with
their individual usernames and passwords and agreed not to disclose the
site's contents. 5 Most of these restricted users were his co-workers, 6 and
3 See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 98-99 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
4 Id. at 98.
5 See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002).
6 Id.
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Konop posted remarks "critical of his employer" on his site.7 Two co-
workers who were authorized users permitted the Vice President to use
their names in order to gain access to the site.8 The court reasoned that
the monitoring by the Vice President did not violate the federal Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) unless one of the co-work-
ers had not actually used the website prior to providing the Vice
President permission to log in with his username. 9
Within the vast field of privacy, which ranges from Fourth Amend-
ment rights to be free from unreasonable police searches and seizures, to
the Constitutional right to an abortion, to tort suits by celebrities, only a
small subset of esteemed academics has thought and written about the
right to privacy in the workplace, even though it is the location that many
people spend most of their waking-hours during their adult lives. 10
These scholars have attempted to define privacy;"1 they have discussed
the difficulty of asserting workplace privacy rights in a legal system gov-
erned by at-will employment; 12 they have explored the overlap between
the workplace and private non-work life; 13 they have discussed the rela-
tionship between the right to privacy and other human rights such as the
right to speak freely, to associate with others,' 4 and to be treated as an
equal; 15 they have thought about the philosophical underpinnings of pri-
vacy as an individual or a group right; 16 and they have considered the
differences between a collective union approach to asserting privacy
7 Id.
8 Id. at 873.
9 Id. at 880.
10 See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66
LA. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2006) ("Another curious aspect of the privacy literature, as well as
the recent Congressional attention, is that it frequently ignores workplace issues, certainly one
of the areas of greatest concern with respect to privacy encroachments.").
11 Id. at 1045.
12 See Anita Bernstein, Foreword: What We Talk About When We Talk About Workplace
Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 923, 936 (2006); Charles B. Craver, Privacy Issues Affecting Employ-
ers, Employees, and Labor Organizations, 66 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1057-58 (2006); Pauline T.
Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to Protecting Employee Privacy: The Experience
with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1024 (2006); Selmi, supra note 10, at
1036.
13 See Selmi, supra note 10, at 1037 ("[Wlhat is sometimes called the boundaryless
workplace now entraps employees far from the confines of the workplace and with virtually no
compensating benefits.").
14 See Selhmi, supra note 10, at 1036-37 ("[T]he issues surrounding privacy are represen-
tative of the broader transformation that has occurred in the workplace over the last three
decades-one where the individual has triumphed over the collective, where solemnity of
privacy has displaced the power of speech and collective action as a paramount workplace
value .... ").
15 See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 935 (discussing power and unions).
16 See Kim, supra note 12, at 1026 ("Although privacy has traditionally been character-
ized as a personal right, a number of considerations suggest that workplace privacy raises
collective concerns."); Bernstein, supra note 12, at 934-35.
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rights and an individual lawsuit approach.' 7 None, however, have re-
cently surveyed the law of the shop,' 8 found in labor arbitration deci-
sions, on the issue of employees' right to privacy from their employers'
technological monitoring.' 9
This Article thus aims to fill a gap in the literature on workplace
privacy by reviewing labor arbitration decisions on privacy and employer
monitoring of employees via new technologies. The Article examines
what the arbitration decisions say about whether and how employees'
privacy should be protected. It uses these decisions as a starting point to
suggest a workable framework for protecting employees' privacy from
employer technological monitoring in the non-union private sector. The
framework provides baseline protection for on-duty actions, intermediate
protection for on-duty expression of thought, such as through computer
usage, and the greatest protection for off-duty conduct.
Section I describes how new technology has exacerbated the prob-
lem of employer monitoring invading employees' privacy. Section II
briefly defines privacy. Section IH describes the lack of adequate legal
protections to insulate employees' privacy from employer technological
monitoring. Section IV summarizes various academic proposals to pro-
tect employees' privacy. Section V summarizes two previous academic
articles addressing privacy protections provided by collective bargaining.
Section VI describes the research methods used to ascertain the law of
the shop governing employees' right to privacy from technological moni-
toring. Section VII discusses the arbitration decisions and proposes ade-
quate safeguards for employees' right to privacy from technological
monitoring.
17 See Kim, supra note 12, at 1010 ("This Comment asks what difference it makes to
think about workers' rights under a collective as opposed to an individual rights model in a
particular context: that of protecting employee privacy.").
18 The "law of the shop" commonly refers to the law governing a workplace pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement and arbitration decisions interpreting it. As put by Justice
Douglas, a collective bargaining agreement "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to
govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate .... It calls into being
a new common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant," and
"[a]rbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for
all the problems which may arise ...." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79, 581 (1960).
19 In 1977, Professor Charles B. Craver "canvass[ed] arbitration decisions dealing with
each of the major security techniques used by employers ...." The Inquisitorial Process in
Private Employment, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4 (1977). The techniques canvassed were em-
ployee interrogation, lie detector tests, searches of workers and their effects, and electronic
surveillance of in-plant activities. Id. at 2.
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I. THE PROBLEM: NEW TECHNOLOGY CREATES PRIVACY ISSUES
FOR EMPLOYEES
The emergence of new technology, such as GPS devices, the In-
ternet, and blogging, creates issues regarding employees' right to privacy
from intrusion by employer monitoring. These issues are different in
degree, if not in kind, from those with which employers have previously
dealt. Professor Finkin states that employee use of e-mail and the In-
ternet continues "to be one of the most vexing and controversial issues in
the United States . . .due in part to the growing number of employees
who use the computer at work and who connect to the Internet or access
e-mail." 20
Indeed, the use of technology in the workplace and, correspond-
ingly, technological monitoring has been steadily increasing over the past
decade. For example, the Privacy Foundation reports that the number of
employees "who regularly use e-mail or Internet access at work" in-
creased "from 30.5 million in January, 2000, to 40.7 million in January,
2001. '21 And the American Management Association (AMA) reports
that in 1997, 13.7% of surveyed employers monitored computer files and
14.9% monitored e-mail while by 2007, the percentages rose to 43% for
both types of monitoring.22
Professor Selmi discusses the role of technology in pushing privacy
to become of greater importance to employees and a greater threat to
employers:
Added to the mix, technology unquestionably changed
the nature of the workplace for many . . . . [W]hen e-
mail replaced the telephone (or fax) as a common means
of communication, it became easier for employees to
feel a sense of privacy . . . .Technological advances
have also enabled employers to act on their suspicions
by providing them with more far-reaching means to
snoop on their employees. 23
Selmi emphasizes the hidden nature of surveillance: "[E]mployees
today are often unaware of their employer's spying. Cameras can be
hidden just about anywhere, technology can monitor keystrokes and
20 MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 115 (2d ed. Supp. 2007).
21 Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: The United
States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 471, 474 (2002).
22 Id. at 474; AMA/ePolicy Institute Research, 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveil-
lance Survey, http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/electronic-monitoring-surveillance-
survey08.pdf (2007).
23 Selmi, supra note 10, at 1042.
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movements throughout the workplace, and tracking devices can be im-
planted without easy detection." 24
The scope of the problem, as illustrated by the scope of employer
monitoring of employees, is widespread. The AMA's 2001 data indi-
cated that 77.7% of surveyed employers recorded and reviewed "em-
ployee communications (or other activities) on the job by monitoring
phone calls [or] voice mail, video recording . . . job performance, [or]
monitoring ... e-mail messages and.., computer files."'25 The AMA's
2007 data indicate that 66% of employers monitor Internet connections,
"12% monitor the blogosphere to see what is being written about the
company," 10% monitor social networking sites, and 8% "use GPS to
track company vehicles."'26 The Privacy Foundation reports that, of
those employees "who regularly use e-mail or Internet access at work,"
fourteen million "are under 'continuous' surveillance . . . for their In-
ternet access or e-mail usage."'27 This number does not include those
who are spot-checked or investigated due to "reasonable suspicion" of
some wrong-doing. 28
And a substantial minority of employers appears to monitor their
employees without notifying them of the monitoring. "Though more ex-
act data are not available, a fair reading is that at least 12% of large or
well financed employers (and perhaps a larger number of others) do not
inform employees of their policies or practices regarding electronic mon-
itoring."'29 Another survey reports that two out of every three "corporate
workplaces have no policy requiring their employees to manifest consent
to electronic monitoring or acknowledging their workplace monitoring
activities." 30
Selmi lists various legitimate employer interests "that often conflict
with employees' desire for workplace privacy. '31 Employers assert
"[c]oncerns about trade secrets, possible harassment suits, employee
24 Id.
25 Finkin, supra note 21, at 474 (surveying companies that employ about a fourth of the
U.S. workforce).
26 AMA/ePolicy Institute Research, supra note 22.
27 Finkin, supra note 21, at 474.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 477; see also AMA/ePolicy Institute Research, supra note 22 (indicating that, of
those monitoring computer activity, 10% don't know if employees are informed and 6% do not
inform employees and, of those monitoring e-mail, 11% do not inform employees and 18%
don't know if employees are informed).
30 Michael L. Rustad & Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-mail and Internet
Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe, 7 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMp. L. 829, 830 (2005) (citing Survey: Most Employers Monitor E-mail, Internet
Use, SACREMENTo Bus. J., Oct. 8, 2003, available at http://www.bizjoumals.comlsacramento/
stories/2003/10/06/daily2O.html.).
31 Selmi, supra note 10, at 1042-43.
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theft, [and] efficiency in the workplace," to "justify keeping a watch on
employees in a way that might infringe upon their privacy interests. '32
In fact, the American Bar Association (ABA) has recently published
two articles voicing concern about "big brother in the workplace. ' 33 One
article begins with an example of an employer who requires those hold-
ing positions with access to a secure data center to have identification
chips implanted in their arms. 34 The author concludes that "[a]lthough
few companies go so far as to implant RFID [radio frequency identifica-
tion] devices in employees, many institutions and individuals are using
biometrics such as facial or iris recognition, fingerprint scans and satel-
lite navigation technology to keep track of employees, children and even
the elderly."'35
The second article notes that "[i]t's becoming increasingly common
for smart cards, fobs and other work-issued devices to be embedded with
Global Positioning System chips, radio frequency identification and
other technologies that allow employers to track every movement of their
employees-both at work and away from it. ' '36 The article asserts that
the longstanding "barrier between the workplace and the private lives of
employees" is "starting to crumble. '37 Employers have more capability
"to engage in" monitoring, and "more employee access to communica-
tions technology" complicates the issue. 3 8
The issue of employees' workplace privacy has also received inter-
national attention. Europe includes the United States on its list of coun-
tries whose workplace privacy protections are inadequate to meet
European privacy laws that include the fundamental right of respect for
an employee's "private and family life," "home," "correspondence," and
"communications. '39 Indeed, the types of situations implicating employ-
ees' privacy raised by the new technologies are myriad. Taxi-cab drivers
protest GPS installation, 40 employees view pornography on computers at
32 Id. at 1043.
33 Jill Schachner Chanen, The Boss is Watching, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2008, at 48, 49; Mar-
garet Graham Tebo, Who's Watching the Watchers?, A.B.A. J., June 2006 at 36.
34 See Tebo, supra note 33, at 36.
35 Id.
36 Chanen, supra note 33, at 49.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 51.
39 See Stephen B. Moldof, International Employee Privacy Issues Panel: Union/Em-
ployee Perspective 10 (May 1, 2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/labor/mw/2008/tech/
pdf/LEL-Tech-Materials.pdf.
40 See Colin Moynihan, Rival Drivers' Groups Disagree on Likelihood of Taxi Strike
Over New Technology, N.Y. TMESS, Aug. 24, 2007, at B6; Alan Feuer, Manhattan: Cabbies'
Group Sues City, N.Y. ThmFs, Sep. 20, 2007, at B7; cf Selmi, supra note 10, at 1044-45
(discussing how the introduction of GPS systems "has often proved controversial with many
claiming that they infringe on employee privacy interests while demonstrating a lack of respect
for employees").
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work,41 young teachers post "risqu6" material on their Facebook pages,
42
and workers post statements about their employers on publicly-available
blogs.43
II. A BASIC AND BRIEF EXPLANATION OF PRIVACY
Professor Summers provides a definition of privacy, based on War-
ren and Brandeis's seminal article, which serves as a good starting point
for understanding privacy's precise nature. 44 According to Summers,
privacy is a protection of an individual's "'inviolate personality,'" which
includes "'the right to be let alone,"' "'seclusion of thoughts and senti-
ments,"' and the rights "to be free from 'spying into the privacy of do-
mestic life,'" and "from revealing of 'facts relating to [one's] private life
which [one] has seen fit to keep private.'"45
One important aspect of privacy is that of selective disclosure. Se-
lective disclosure, or group privacy, is the concept "'that individuals
want to keep things private from some people but not others.'"46 ", 'Indi-
viduals typically tailor their behavior to the expected audience,"'4 7 and
when their behavior is exposed to "'a completely different audience"'
than the one intended or expected, their "'expectations of anonymity and
their autonomy in selecting to whom they will reveal parts of them-
selves"' are violated.48
41 See Finkin, supra note 21, at 483-84 (citing Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 18 IER Cases 981, *2 (D. Mass. 2002) (despite employer instructing employees "on how
to create passwords and personal e-mail files," an employee had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the content of sexual e-mail messages and could be terminated)); Chanen, supra
note 33, at 51 (employee terminated because a friend "regularly sent him e-mails containing
pornographic images" despite the fact that the employee had "set his e-mail program to auto-
matically delete the friend's e-mails").
42 See Ian Shapira, When Young Teachers Go Wild on the Web, WASH. POST, Apr. 28,
2008, at A01; cf. Chanen, supra note 33, at 50 (teacher fired after partner posted topless
picture on photo-sharing website).
43 Cf. MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 290 (2d ed. 2003) (discuss-
ing instances where employers fired or sued employees for posts to homepages or chat
boards).
44 See Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism and Autonomy in American La-
bor Law, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 453, 467-68 (2001) (citing Samuel Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)). For a comparative
historical study of the meaning of privacy in Western law, see Finkin, supra note 1.
45 Summers, supra note 44, at 467-68 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 44 at
195-96.).
46 Daniel P. O'Gorman, Looking Out For Your Employees: Employer's Surreptitious
Physical Surveillance of Employees and the Tort of Invasion of Privacy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 212,
243 (2006) (quoting Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087, 1108
(2002)).
47 Id. at 243 (quoting Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive New-
sgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REv. 173, 237 (1998)).
48 Id. (quoting Lidsky, supra note 47, at 237).
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Ill. IN THE UNITED STATES, EMPLOYEES HAVE VERY LIMITED
PROTECTION OF THEIR RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Although most people "think they enjoy certain privacy protections
when they are at work," they in fact do not.49 Finkin, in his comprehen-
sive survey of laws governing an employee's right to privacy in the
United States, concludes:
The United States has no comprehensive, coherent con-
ception of how employer and employee interests in the
collection, collation, use, and dissemination of personal
data are best balanced. Rather, it is a skein of discrete
pockets of legislation woven against the background of a
common law that fails to fill in the gaps. 50
Such limited protection means that an employee is entitled to virtu-
ally no expectation of privacy in the workplace. An employer can photo-
graph an employee in compromising positions, track the quick stop an
employee makes at home or at a significant other's, 51 and read an em-
ployee's e-mail, including messages containing personal information
from family members. Such limited protection also generally means that
an employer can pry into an employee's off-duty conduct such as smok-
ing cigarettes or dating someone of a different race. Indeed, an employer
can record an employee urinating in his secluded yard.52
A. Common Law Provides Only Limited Protection for the Privacy of
Employees Whose Employers Conduct Surveillance of Their
Behavior
Common law's limited protection of employee privacy has been
well-documented. 53 The tort of intrusion upon seclusion requires that the
complainant have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that any viola-
49 Craver, supra note 12, at 1069 (citing Richard S. Rosenberg, The Technological As-
sault on Ethics in the Modem Workplace, in TiE ETHICS OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 141, 148 (John W. Budd & James G. Scoville eds., 2005)).
50 FiKtN, supra note 43, at 346. While most commentators agree that the laws in the
United States do not adequately provide for employee privacy in the face of emerging technol-
ogy, not all do. See, e.g., O'Gorman, supra note 46, at 275 (arguing that the limited protection
for invasion of privacy provided by the courts is appropriate in light of company's needs to
surreptitiously monitor employees and to avoid litigation).
51 In some states, employers would be prohibited from taking disciplinary action based
on the discovery that an empoyee's significant other is of the same sex, but in many they
would not. See FINKIN, supra note 43, at 402-03.
52 See O'Gorman, supra note 46, at 248-49.
53 Cf Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers: Em-
ployee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 315-19 (2007) (discussing
the limited ability of public policy exceptions to protect against termination of at-will employ-
ees for off-duty conduct).
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tion of that expectation be highly offensive.54 Typically, courts find that
employees meet neither requirement. The reasonable expectation "can
be dispelled by an employer's announcement that no such expectation
exists." And "systemic measures taken in what business believes to be in
its economic or administrative interest [are] rarely held to be capable of
giving offense, at least by judges."'55
Summers outlines a host of cases suggesting that "[m]ost courts...
in balancing the employer's interest against the degree of intrusion place
a heavy hand on the employers' side."' 56 Two cases raise interesting is-
sues of modem technology. One is the Smyth case mentioned in the In-
troduction. In the other, Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., an employer
investigated an employee collecting compensation for a work injury.57
The employer, among other things, used a telephoto camera to take pic-
tures through an open window of activity inside the employee's home.58
"The court, without weighing the degree of intrusion against the em-
ployer's need, found no unreasonable intrusion of privacy because 'pri-
vacy is subject to the legitimate interests of the employer."' 59
Summers concludes:
There is, of course, room for disagreement as to how
much weight should be given to each of these interests,
but for the courts, the employee's right of privacy is a
hollow shell against the lead weight of the employer's
claim to run his business as he pleases. The employee's
sanctity of his home can be invaded by a telephoto cam-
era or a fraudulent entry to simplify the employer's de-
termining whether an employee is only pretending to be
sick. An employer's desire to discover dissatisfied em-
ployees justifies intercepting an employee's private e-
mail messages even when he has been repeatedly as-
sured of privacy.60
B. Additional Statutory Protection for Employees' Right to Privacy is
Generally Piecemeal
No comprehensive statutory scheme supplements the common law
to provide protection for employees' privacy or even simply from em-
54 FiraN, supra note 43, at 346.
55 Id.
56 Summers, supra note 44, at 469.
57 See Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 383-84 (Mich. App. 1989).
58 Id.
59 Summers, supra note 44, at 469 (quoting Saldana, 443 N.W.2d at 384).
60 Id. at 475.
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ployer monitoring. 6 1 Instead, a variety of federal and state laws offer
only targeted and limited protections. 62 The statutes summarized herein
are illustrative.
One federal statute, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, pro-
tects employees from a specific type of privacy intrusion-intrusion by
polygraph test. 63 The statute generally prohibits employers from requir-
ing employees to take a polygraph test, and employees may not waive
their right to this protection.64
Some states provide privacy protections from employer drug test-
ing. These range from states that prohibit random drug testing to states
that limit testing to safety-sensitive jobs to states that provide confidenti-
ality protections for such testing.65
61 Finkin, supra note 21, at 473.
62 See Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CH-
KENT L. REv. 221, 224 (1996) ("[T]he legislative response has varied from the occasional and
piecemeal... to the non-existent. The latter may be explained for the most part by the politics
of privacy, which pits organized business interests against a largely unorganized mass of indi-
vidual workers."); Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 291 ("Over the past three decades, a
majority of states have enacted statutes protecting a few specific employee off-duty activi-
ties."); O'Gorman, supra note 46, at 216 n.25 (describing state legislation "prohibiting certain
surveillance of employees by employers"); Summers, supra note 44, at 478 ("Federal and state
statutes, at best, give only freckled protection to employees who are unjustly discharged, they
give no general recognition to the right of individual autonomy of workers.").
63 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (2000). A federal bill that would have protected em-
ployee's privacy, the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993),
never passed. The purpose was to prevent abuses of electronic monitoring through safeguards
such as notice to employees about what activity will be monitored, restrictions on the ways
employers use information obtained through electronic monitoring, and prohibition of certain
types of monitoring. More recently, another bill, the Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act,
H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000), also failed to pass. It would have required employers to
provide notice before monitoring e-mail and Internet use. The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21, 2701-11 (2000), generally regulates electronic
communications. But there are definitions and exceptions in both parts of the ECPA, the
Wiretap Act, and the Stored Communications Act that might apply to employer monitoring of
employees that generally exempt such monitoring. See Finkin, supra note 21, at 479-82,
484-89. One notable potential protection provided by the ECPA, however, is protection from
disclosure of an employee's name to an employer from an entity providing electronic commu-
nications service to the public. See id. at 487-88.
64 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (2000); Summers, supra note 44, at 475-76 (citing 29
U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (2000)); see also Selmi, supra note 10, at 1042 ("Other than the curious
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, which might be seen as affording some privacy by gener-
ally banning the use of polygraphs, there are few federal statutory protections .... "). But in
public sector labor arbitrations, arbitrators apparently continue to discuss the appropriateness
of relying on polygraph test results as evidence. See Jefferson County Sheriff's Office v. Fra-
ternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1508, 1515
(2000) (Klein, Arb.). Thus, while Professor Craver's 1970s position regarding polygraph ex-
ams has not generally been adopted, his observations may still be relevant in the arbitral con-
text. Craver, supra note 19, at 40-43.
65 Summers, supra note 44, at 476.
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Approximately thirty states protect against discipline for smoking
off-duty and away from the employer's premises. 66 Some extend this
protection to "off-duty use of lawful products. '67 "Two states, Connecti-
cut and Delaware, have legislated to require notice of [electronic] moni-
toring."' 68 New York prohibits employers from using a two-way mirror
to surreptitiously observe employees in restrooms.69 New York also pro-
hibits employers from video recording in employee restrooms, locker
rooms, and changing rooms.70 Rhode Island prohibits both video and
audio recording in restrooms. 71
Two states, Illinois and Michigan, prohibit employers "from gather-
ing or keeping a record of an employee's associations, political activities,
publications, or communications of non-employment activities, unless
authorized by the employee in writing or unless the activity occurs on the
employer's premises or during working hours and interferes in the per-
formance of the employee's or other employees' duties." 72
In four states, California, New York, Colorado, and North Dakota,
statutes protect against discharge or adverse action because of any lawful
off-duty conduct.73 The level of protection varies, with North Dakota
protecting any activity "not in direct conflict with the essential business-
related interests of the employer," and Colorado protecting only that ac-
tivity which does not present "the appearance of ... a conflict of inter-
est."' 74 The enforcement mechanisms also vary considerably.75 In only
one state, Montana, are employers required to show just cause for
discharge.76
Finally, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and collective-
bargaining provide some privacy protections in the unionized
workforce. 77 It is to the latter that this Article looks for guidance in
66 See Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 320; see also Selmi supra note 10, at 1052 ("A
number of states have sought to protect off-work activities legislatively, often at the behest of
the tobacco lobby which has sought to protect off-work smoking.").
67 Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 320.
68 Finkin, supra note 21, at 477-78, nn. 36-37 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48(d)
(1999); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 19, § 705(b) (2002 Supp.)).
69 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 395-96 (2004 Supp.).
70 Id.
71 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.12-1 (2005 Supp.).
72 Finkin, supra note 21, at 491, & n.112 (citing ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. Ch. 820, § 40/9
(1999); MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 423.508 (1995)).
73 See Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 320.
74 Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 321, nn.250-51 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
02.4-03 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-403.(1)(b) (2008)).
75 Id. at 326.
76 See Summers, supra note 44, at 478; Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 315 (citing
Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MoNT. CODE ANN. COMP. §§ (2) 39-2-
901-915 (2005)).
77 See Finkin, supra note 21, at 498-501 (discussing NLRA protection against monitor-
ing, including electronic monitoring, of protected activity). But see Register-Guard, 351
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fashioning appropriate comprehensive protection for employee privacy
from employer monitoring.
IV. PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS THE PRIVACY ISSUES RESULTING FROM
EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
A number of academic proposals address the types of workplace
privacy issues raised by newly emergent technology, and several include
proposals related to employer monitoring of employees. This section
briefly discusses three proposals that well-illustrate the spectrum of pro-
tections proposed. Professor Selmi proposes a dualistic system providing
an extensive right to privacy while off-duty and a limited right while on-
duty. 78 Professors Gely and Bierman propose activity-specific legisla-
tion to protect blogging.79 And Professor Rustad and Sandra Paulsson
propose federal legislation, modeled on European privacy protections, to
protect employees' Internet and e-mail use at work.8 0
A. Professor Selmi Proposes a Dualistic System of Protection with a
Nearly Absolute Right to Privacy While Off-Duty and Almost
No Right to Privacy in the Workplace
Selmi proposes extensive, almost absolute protection of an em-
ployee's right to privacy when not at work.8 1 He recommends that even
if an employer requires an employee to complete work at home on com-
pany-provided equipment, the employer should not have "the right to
look into that home."'82 He reasons that employees should not have to
open their entire life to employer view because that would violate a cen-
tral value of privacy-"the right to determine how much of one's self
NLRB No. 70 (Dec. 16, 2007) (employers can prohibit use of computers for "non-job-related
solicitations," including union solicitations, unless the employer discriminates by banning only
some "organizational notices").
78 See Selmi, supra note 10, at 1056.
79 See Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 303-14; see also Jill Yung, Big Brother is
Watching: How Employee Monitoring in 2004 Brought Orwell's 1984 to Life and What the
Law Should Do About It, 36 SEToN HALL L. REV. 163 (2005) (proposing specific legislation to
address monitoring via GPS).
80 See Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 30, at 895; see also Gail Lasprogata, Nancy J.
King & Sukanya Pillay, Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring: Identifying Funda-
mental Principles of Employee Privacy Through a Comparative Study of Data Privacy Legis-
lation in the European Union, United States and Canada, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 5
(proposing employers voluntarily honor fundamental privacy principles).
81 See Selmi, supra note 10, at 1046, 1052-53 ("It is one thing to give an employer broad
dominion over its own workplace but quite another to extend that dominion wherever the
employee goes.") ("The public policy tort should be extended to include all off-work activity,
and require the employer to substantiate a legitimate business interest that outweighs the em-
ployee's interests in order to uphold a termination for off-work activity.").
82 Id. at 1046-47.
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one wants to reveal to the world . . "83 He proposes that not even a
legitimate interest should entitle an employer to invade an employee's
privacy outside of the workplace. 84
Selmi additionally proposes that "any time an employer terminates
an employee for lawful off-work activity, the employer must provide a
compelling justification for its actions sufficient to override the em-
ployee's substantial interest in off-work autonomy.185 He reasons that
an employer could prevail by showing that an employee's conduct attrib-
utable to the employer "might bring public opprobrium" and damage the
employer's reputation.86
But Selmi does not propose protecting an employee's right to pri-
vacy at work beyond that to be free of bodily invasion (or that obtained
through contract). 87 He reasons that "an employee has been hired to
work, and has no right to send private e-mails, view pornography, shop,
blog, instant message, or talk on the telephone. '88 He concludes that
when an employer tolerates such conduct, toleration does not give rise to
a right to privacy, although it may give rise to an implied contract.89
He proposes this dualistic framework as most compatible with em-
ployment-at-will. 90 He reasons that to provide employees better work-
places would require "overhauling the entire system," whereas keeping
employers "out of employee homes, out of city council meetings, [and]
out of their employee's private lives" is fully possible.91
The proposal is a practical one in that the bright-line between on-
duty activity and off-duty activity makes it relatively straightforward for
employers to follow. As Selmi claims, the proposal is also congruent
with employment-at-will to the extent that it permits the employer almost
unlimited ability to monitor employees and their work and to discipline
as the employer sees fit based on any information discovered. Such lee-
way enables management to efficiently manage.
83 Id. at 1046.
84 See id. at 1047. But he does include an exception that might in many instances swal-
low the rule. If an employee chooses to work at home, then the employee will have no privacy
interest in the contents of any employer issued equipment used at home. See id. at 1048.
85 Id. at 1053.
86 Id.
87 See id. at 1043, 1045; cf CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGErHER: How WORKPLACE
BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 158 (2003) ("It is no answer to say-as defend-
ers of harassment law sometimes do-that 'the workplace is for work.' As we have seen, the
workplace is for much more than work, both in the lives of individual workers and in the
society as a whole. The law should not adopt as its motto a proposition that would so impov-
erish social life.").
88 Sehi, supra note 10, at 1043.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 1055 ("[T]his sharp distinction is most consistent with the employment-at-
will rule .... ").
91 Selmi, supra note 10, at 1056.
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But the proposal is not congruent with employment-at-will to the
extent it forbids employers from monitoring off-work activity and to the
extent it places a heavy burden on employers to show a compelling justi-
fication for terminating an employee for off-duty conduct. These off-
duty protections undermine the assertion that the proposal is consistent
with employment-at-will. Instead, the proposal is grounded in the argu-
ment that pushing for such a dualistic approach is realistic. In other
words, the underlying rationale is that it is easier to challenge the gov-
erning framework of employment-at-will when dealing with conduct
outside the workplace than within.
Because workable privacy protections will, however, at least to
some extent challenge the employment-at-will system, there is no practi-
cal reason to limit protections to outside the workplace. Rather, a pri-
vacy framework can satisfy employers' interests in monitoring and
protect employees' privacy rights without providing the employer an ab-
solute right to monitor in the workplace. 92
Furthermore, privacy protections should be guaranteed in the work-
place, even if doing so challenges the employment-at-will system. The
workplace has become, as a practical matter, a place for more than work
and should be, as an aspirational goal, a place for more than work. Ex-
pecting employees to do nothing at work, except work, and to give up
their privacy when they do otherwise, is unrealistic. The American
workplace has become "boundaryless. ' '93 Given the relentless American
drive for efficiency, the internationalization of work, advances in tech-
nology, and the recognition that flexible work enables many to enjoy a
more satisfactory work-life balance, the overlap between work and life is
unlikely to cease. Many people work two, or even three jobs,94 while
others work much of the time on one.95 Many people work at home and
92 See discussion infra Section VII suggesting possible frameworks based on a review of
the arbitration decisions.
93 Selmi, supra note 10, at 1037.
94 See Belinda M. Smith, Time Norms in the Workplace: Their Exclusionary Effect and
Potential for Change, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 271, 278 (2002) ("Between six and thirteen
percent of all employees report having two or more jobs.").
95 Id. at 277 ("The United States is one of only two industrialized countries that has more
than twenty percent of its workforce working fifty hours or more per week.").
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conduct personal life at work.96 And many employees use technology at
work.
9 7
Selmi recognizes that an employee's right to keep off-duty actions
private from an employer is a fundamental value. But the proposal
largely fails to recognize any view of an employee as a human in the
workplace.98 The proposal takes the position that "work-is-for-work-
ing," that employment at-will leaves little room for human dignity in the
workplace, and that privacy is not a significant workplace value. 99 Selmi
argues that blue-collar workers value family above work and likely place
little value on workplace privacy.100 Selmi himself concedes that "al-
lowing employers such broad dominion over the workplace may func-
tionally turn that workplace into the equivalent of a prison, where
employee rights parallel the limited rights of prisoners."'' °
Yet humans do not cease being human in the workplace. Simply
because certain groups of people, such as the working class or Gen X,
purport to work in order to provide for themselves and their families or
to enjoy time away from work, 102 does not mean that the workplace is
not an appropriate place to protect privacy. These groups might place
more value on work if employers treated them more humanely, including
protecting their privacy. Additionally, many groups, such as profession-
als and older cohorts, do view the workplace as a venue for personal
fulfillment.10 3 While the debate over the purposes of work will doubtless
rage eternally, in a democratic society, work should be for more than
work. It should be a place for personal growth, a means to contribute to
96 Robert Sprague, From Taylorisim to the Omnipticon: Expanding Employee Surveil-
lance Beyond the Workplace, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 27 & n.219 (2007);
Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 297 ("As Professor Patrick Schlitz has noted in the context
of large law firms, current work-hour requirements may result in employees having little time
for anything other than work.") (citing Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and
Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871,
888-95 (1999)).
97 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 262, 274 (2008) ("A 2003 survey estimated that forty percent of all workers
used the Internet or e-mail at work.") (citing BLS Finds 55 Percent of Employees Used Com-
puters at Work in October 2003, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 148, at D-24 (Aug. 3, 2005)).
98 See Selmi, supra note 10, at 1045.
99 See id. at 1045-46.
100 See id. at 1046 (citing MICHELE LAMONT, THE DIGNITY OF WORKING MEN: MORAL-
ITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF RACE, CLASS AND IMAGINATION 30 (Harvard University Press
2000)).
lot Id. at 1056.
102 See Kathleen Brady, From Law Student to Lawyer, 36 STUDENT LAWYER 20, 22
(2008) ("For Gen Xers, work is seen as a means to an end. While they also enjoy the personal
fulfillment that comes with a job well done, they expect to be paid for their efforts. Their
reward is the freedom that money buys them to pursue outside interests.").
103 See id. ("For the Veterans, work fulfills a sense of duty and the only reward needed is
knowing you've done your job well .... Boomers work for a sense of personal fulfillment
and find their reward in the status that comes with hard work.").
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society, and possibly a way to help the young. Providing privacy protec-
tions at work can help further these goals.'04
Selmi bases his dualistic proposal on his understanding of the "nos-
talgic workplace"-that of the 1940's through 70's, where union density
was at thirty percent, and other companies mimicked the union work-
place because of the threat of unionization. 10 5 At work, "there was fre-
quently no place to hide, no place for meaningful privacy."' 10 6 But away
from work, to the extent an employee's conduct "did not interfere with
her employment, there might be a protectable privacy interest because
that behavior was none of the employer's business."107
Yet a review of more recent labor arbitration decisions suggests a
more nuanced approach that can serve as a starting point for a workable
framework for protecting employees' rights to privacy both on and off
the job. 10 8
B. Professors Gely and Bierman Propose Modifying State Legislation
to Protect Blogging
Professors Gely and Bierman view blogs as "virtual union halls
where employees can connect, building social ties and reducing the isola-
tion inherent in present-day American life."' 1 9 While they do not frame
the issue as one of privacy, they decry employers' ability to terminate
employees for off-duty blogging.I10 They recommend amending state
statutes that currently provide protection for specific off-duty activities,
such as smoking, to incorporate protection for off-duty blogging."'I
Gely and Bierman discuss how over the last century "monitoring
and control of employee speech has increased considerably,"', 12 "job se-
104 For instance, privacy protections may contribute to an employee's feelings of worth,
enabling the employee to focus better on the work and to contribute to the employee's full
capacity. Adequate privacy protections would likely include notice of related infractions,
which would enable employees to avoid conduct harmful to the employer, or at a minimum, to
learn from their mistakes and mature into more useful contributors. Of course, one employee
is unlikely to be able to engage in personal growth, contribute to society, and help the young
all at the same job. Many will be able to fulfill none of these goals on the job because a job is
ultimately limited by the tasks that must be performed in order to produce the service or
product. This is one reason that there should also be protection for off-duty conduct.
105 See Selmi, supra note 10, at 1039.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1039-40.
108 See infra Section VII.
109 Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 288. Blogs are not truly analogous to a union hall,
a space where not only members, but union officials and employees, conduct the affairs of a
representative that has legal authority in the workplace.
110 See id. at 290-91.
111 See id. at 291.
112 Id. at 299.
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curity has declined in tandem with falling levels of unionization," 1 13 and
harassment laws have created incentives for employers to censor speech
and limit social interactions between employees. 114 They propose pro-
tection for off-duty blogging as an antidote to the social isolation result-
ing from these trends.1 15 Protection would not, however, extend to blogs
that disclose confidential information, to harassing speech directed to-
ward a co-worker or supervisor, or to certain other kinds of abusive
blogging. 1 16
Gely and Bierman assert that the policy underlying some of the state
statutes is that employees should be able to smoke "off-duty in return for
their compliance with any employer rules prohibiting smoking while on
the job."' 17 They analogize: in return for the broad discretion "employ-
ers should have" to regulate computer usage at work, employees' use of
their computers when off work should be protected.1 18
Their proposal would "address an important social concern in a lim-
ited and targeted manner." 119 It would also "involve easily administrable
bright line rules." 120 Gely and Bierman's piecemeal approach is prag-
matic, and likely to succeed in providing protection for a limited em-
ployee right to blog, a right that the law would not otherwise protect.
On the other hand, their proposal does not address an employee's
right to privacy in the workplace; it does not protect against invasion of
privacy through similar technology, such as Facebook or MySpace, a
Google Doc, a wiki, or a yet-to-be-invented technology; and it does not
provide protection from different types of technological monitoring of
off-duty conduct.
For reasons discussed in response to Selmi's proposal, failing to
protect against violations of privacy while on-duty is not a tenable path
towards privacy protection. 121 Workers spend too much time at work to
lightly give up such rights in return for off-duty protection. Additionally,
a piecemeal approach, while pragmatic, is unlikely to adapt to changes in
technology. Each time a new technology replaces an old one, further
statutory amendment will need to be sought. On the other hand, a pri-
vacy policy that protects systemically, based on the nature of the inva-
113 Id. at 300.
114 Id. at 301.
115 See id. at 302-03.
116 See id. at 330.




121 See supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
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sion rather than the specific technology, is likely to remain effective for a
longer period of time.12 2
C. Professor Rustad and Sandra Paulsson Propose a Federal Law
Governing Monitoring of Computer Use Based on European
Insights
Professor Rustad and Sandra Paulsson survey European privacy
laws, particularly those of England 123 and France,124 governing the mon-
itoring of employee e-mail and Internet usage. They note a "divergence
in the value placed upon informational privacy" in the United States and
Europe. 125
Based on the insights from European law, Rustad and Paulsson pro-
pose a federal electronic monitoring act. The act would require employ-
ers to "formulate clear e-mail and Internet guidelines."' 126 Employers
would then be required to provide written notice of the program to em-
ployees before implementing a monitoring program. The act would also
require that employees consent to the monitoring. Then the employer
would have to provide electronic notice of monitoring each time an em-
ployee accesses a company computer system. "Finally, all employers...
would be required to articulate legitimate business reasons for instituting
a monitoring program," and would be entitled to monitor only for that
reason.127 Violations of these requirements would subject employers to
"criminal as well as civil penalties, including compensatory as well as
punitive damages," and employees in some cases would receive attor-
neys' fees and costs. 128
One advantage of this system is that United States companies
"would have, in effect, a safe harbor in cross-border communications
with their European trading partners."' 129 The authors also believe the
measure would be a "first step in preventing U.S. companies from de-
volving into electronic sweatshops."'' 30
The proposal includes some appropriate safeguards for employee
privacy when using an employer's computer. Furthermore, the bright-
line nature of the proposal-requiring notice and a legitimate business
reason in all instances-should render it relatively easy for employers to
122 See discussion infra Section VII.C.
123 See Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 30, at 884-90.
124 See id. at 890-95.
125 Id. at 831.
126 Id. at 862.
127 Id. at 900.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 832.
130 Id.
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comply with. Additionally, because the proposal is based on European
laws, it has been shown to work in other regions.
Nevertheless, some will object that differences between the Euro-
pean legal system and traditions and those of the United States make
implementation of any such system difficult, or even inappropriate. As
the authors note, "Americans reflexively dismiss Europe as a clapped-out
old continent-a wonderful place to visit but hardly the anvil of the fu-
ture." 3' Indeed, it may be possible, as a review of the labor arbitration
decisions below indicates, to develop a more nuanced and flexible ap-
proach to protecting employee privacy.132 Such an approach might re-
spond more adequately to employer concerns, while at the same time
providing adequate safeguards for employees' privacy.
Moreover, Rustad and Paulsson's proposal addresses only computer
usage but does not deal with other aspects of employer monitoring or
informational privacy. As the authors recognize, it is designed as a start-
ing point and not an end point "in developing a labor law that truly re-
spects the dignity of the person."' 133
V. THE BACKDROP OF PRIOR PRECEDENT: LABOR ARBITRATION
DECISIONS PROVIDE A LONG-STANDING, UNIQUELY
AMERICAN PRECEDENT FOR ADDRESSING
WORKPLACE PRIVACY ISSUES
One starting point for thinking about how to address employees'
concerns is to look at how they are addressed in the union setting, where
there is a long history of dealing with workplace disputes. 34 In 1960,
the Supreme Court decided three cases, known as the Steelworkers' Tril-
ogy, and established arbitration as the preferred dispute resolution mech-
anism in the unionized sector.' 35 Since then, labor arbitrators have
grappled with issues of emerging technology and potential resultant inva-
sions of employees' privacy, whether couched in those terms or not. 136
131 Id. (quoting Old America v. New Europe, ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 2003, at 32.).
132 See discussion infra Section VII.
133 Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 30, at 904.
134 See Craver, supra note 19, at 7 ("[T]he arbitration process has provided the only
major forum for weighing employer and employee interests in the security area, and has devel-
oped an analytical framework-adaptable in almost every employment context-for dealing
with each of the major security techniques in use today.").
135 See Katherine V. W. Stone, The Steelworkers' Trilogy: The Evolution of Labor Arbi-
tration, 180, 185, in LABOR LAW STORES (Cooper & Fisk, eds. 2005) (discussing United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and their impact on arbitration in
the United States).
136 See Craver, supra note 19, at 4 (discussing how "[a] substantial body of arbitration
case law has resulted" from challenges to "the reasonableness of particular searches or interro-
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Academics have written about the privacy protections afforded to
employees in the unionized setting, including protections from polygraph
testing, searches, surveillance, discipline for off-duty activity, drug test-
ing, and appearance codes.1 37 Indeed, arbitrators have previously dealt
with changes in technology and its impact on employees' privacy rights.
Labor arbitrators make decisions about today's emerging technologies,
such as GPS, e-mail, and Internet use against the backdrop of these long-
standing precedents. Thus, some background on previous studies of pri-
vacy rights in the unionized setting is appropriate before discussing the
specific findings of the decisions addressing today's emerging
technologies.
This section will discuss the conclusions of Professors Craver and
Summers about the types and level of protections afforded for employee
privacy in the unionized workplace. These conclusions are representa-
tive of the general understanding of the protections provided; an under-
standing this Article aims to enhance by providing a detailed review of
the concepts found in decisions addressing more recent technologies.
A. Professor Craver's 1970's Review of Arbitration Decisions
Addressing Employer Monitoring of Employees and His
Proposals for Adequate On-Duty Privacy Protections Serve
as Background for Developing Workable Privacy
Protections Based on Present Day Arbitration Decisions
Craver envisions arbitration over employer security techniques that
raise privacy issues as "the balancing of employer interests in industrial
efficiency against employee interests in privacy and personal dignity." 138
He states:
It is generally recognized that employers are 'permitted
by law and by contract to make such rules and regula-
tions as are not inconsistent with the parties' collective
bargaining agreement, and which are reasonably neces-
sary for the smooth, efficient conduct of the business-
even though at times they may impinge on the em-
ployee's personal privacy.' Nevertheless, some manage-
gations" and "there are now general areas of agreement among arbitrators as to the propriety of
various security measures").
137 See, e.g., Marion Crain, Expanded Employee Drug-Detection Programs and the Pub-
lic Good: Big Brother at the Bargaining Table, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1286 (1989); Pauline T.
Kim, supra note 12; Michael J. Yelnosky, What Do Unions Do About Appearance Codes, 14
DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 521 (2007).
138 Craver, supra note 19, at 5.
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ment practices inevitably become so intrusive as to
offend contemporary standards. 139
Craver discusses how the right balance might consider factors
outside the facts of the case. He points out that a solitary invasion of
privacy might not appear overly intrusive, but, in certain cases, in con-
junction with a course of conduct on the employer's part, it might be
unreasonable. 140 He also mentions that employee conduct causes ap-
proximately one-third of all business closures, and that overly restricting
an employer's ability to check for misconduct can lead to job loss for
innocent employees.141
Craver discusses the application of these principles in three con-
texts: polygraph exams, searches, and surveillance.
1. Polygraph Exams
Craver makes a proposal regarding polygraph exams that bears on
the issue of when e-mail surveillance should be permitted because both
technologies monitor the thoughts of the employee. He suggests that
three baseline considerations must be shown: serious employee miscon-
duct is suspected; other investigative techniques have been attempted or
are unworkable; and the employer has a reasonable suspicion that the
employee has relevant information.' 42 Furthermore, the scope of the in-
quiry should be as narrow as possible, and none of the responses to per-
sonal questions should be disclosed to management officials. 143 In
addition, only the relevant answers should be disclosed, and only to ap-
propriate persons. 144
Four of the safeguards that Craver suggests-using a confidential
reviewer, limiting the scope of information collection, monitoring based
on reasonable suspicion, and using alternative methods prior to resorting
to monitoring-are suggested by recent arbitration cases. The fifth pro-
tection that Craver suggests-monitoring only when serious misconduct
is suspected-offers another protection that could be appropriately used
as part of the range of protections when the conduct is off-duty or when
monitoring of on-duty speech is surreptitious.
139 Id. at 5 (quoting Scheiber, Tests and Questionnaires in the Labor-Management Rela-
tionship, 20 LAB. L.J. 695, 697 (1969)).
140 See id. at 6.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 41.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 41-42.
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE
2. Searches
Craver also summarizes his understanding of the arbitral authority
governing searches. 145 This framework also bears on the issue of ade-
quate protections from computer monitoring and on monitoring ad-
dressed to employees' on-duty actions, such as by GPS.
As to entrance and exit searches, and searches of specified personal
property, such as large purses, Craver summarizes as follows: 146
Generally speaking, the security procedure must be one
that is clearly established, fairly administered, and un-
derstood by all workers. If an arbitrator determines that
an inspection rule has been arbitrarily applied, or has
been promulgated in a manner which has not sufficiently
apprised the workers of their obligations thereunder, he
may order the rescission or modification of any discipli-
nary action taken against the employees who failed to
cooperate in the search. 147
Additionally, an employer may condition access to semi-private
spaces, such as a locker, on the right to inspect the contents at any
time. 148 Even without a rule, employers can examine an employee's per-
sonal property that is contained within employer property, such as a
locker, when the employer has a reasonable suspicion that contraband or
misappropriated company property is also therein. Craver points out
that, "If no such presupposition exists, however, the immediate proprie-
tary interest of the worker in his personal belongings should take prece-
dence over the employer's ownership right, and a search should not be
permitted."' 14
9
On the other hand, an employer does not have the right to "examine
a worker's belongings that are not situated in a company container."' 150
Mere presence of the employee's belongings on company property does
not suffice to permit a search. An employer may only search the em-
ployee's belongings when the employer has probable cause to believe
discovery of serious misconduct will result and other means of discovery
have failed. 151
145 See id. at 46.
146 Craver specifically states that as to personal property, as opposed to entrance and exit
searches, that if there is a "carefully defined management rule" requiring inspection of per-
sonal property, such as large purses, compliance with the rule is a condition of employment.
Id. at 47.
147 Id. at 46.
148 See id.
149 Id. at 47.
150 Id. at 49.
151 Id.
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Craver's ultimate proposal for protecting employees from employer
searches is that "arbitrators should recognize an implied covenant in col-
lective bargaining agreements acknowledging the fundamental right of
employees to be free from unreasonable management encroachments."'' 5 2
Breach of the covenant would result in monetary damages and, in some
cases, modification of the imposed discipline. Interestingly, however, he
proposes that when an employer "acts in good faith on a mistaken belief
in its authority to conduct the search," the evidence discovered should be
admitted and termination for gross misconduct should be upheld. 153
Four additional safeguards, beyond the five discussed in relation to
polygraphs, are suggested by Craver's discussion of searches: an affirma-
tive right to refuse to be searched, notice of monitoring, notice of the
particulars of the monitoring, and enforcement of the noticed policy.
Craver's proposal for an implied covenant suggests two additional pro-
tections: compensation for violations of privacy and restrictions on disci-
pline based on inappropriately gathered information.
Use of such safeguards is likely more workable than conditioning
imposition of discipline on the sometimes nebulous "good faith" stan-
dard. Thus, the availability of privacy protection should turn on the de-
gree of the monitoring's invasiveness, whether satisfactory privacy
safeguards were utilized, and the severity of the offense. For instance, if
an employee has committed gross misconduct, such as sharing trade
secrets, then the employee could be terminated if other mandatory safe-
guards were afforded, regardless of whether the employer acted in good
faith when monitoring the employee's e-mail.
3. Surveillance
Craver also discusses surveillance, through photographic and eaves-
dropping equipment, among other means. 154 The safeguards discussed,
or lack thereof, might bear on monitoring of employee's actions through
other means, such as GPS, or even potentially on monitoring of employ-
ees' electronic communications.
Craver concludes that employers generally have the right to conduct
surveillance, surreptitious or not, of an employee based on "previously
developed suspicions."'155 The use of surveillance techniques "in pro-
duction areas, stockrooms, loading zones, and similar locations" is ap-
propriate.1 56 Craver discusses one arbitration decision where the
arbitrator explained that, "'[i]t should be evident that an employee's ac-
152 Id. at 50.
153 See id.
154 See id. at 51.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 55-56.
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tions during working hours are not private actions."' 157 The arbitrator
reasoned that a camera is simply a difference in the degree of observa-
tion, but not a difference in kind. 158
However, in areas where employees are "entitled to privacy," such
as lavatories and lounges, surveillance should be limited. 159 Craver sug-
gests that "Congress should ... prohibit all surreptitious visual monitor-
ing of employees under circumstances entitling them to a reasonable
expectation of privacy."'160
Neither the arbitral authority as summarized by Craver nor his pro-
posal provides significant protection for employees' right to privacy
from employer monitoring of their actions while working. While a mini-
mal level of protection is appropriate for such monitoring, some combi-
nation of safeguards should still apply to guarantee that employers do not
abuse quickly evolving technology.
B. Professor Summers's Discussion of the Privacy Protections
Provided for Off-Duty Behavior Provide Further Background
for Developing Workable Privacy Protections Based on
Labor Arbitration Decisions
Summers discusses the union framework protecting individual au-
tonomy, of which he considers the right to privacy a subset. 161 He as-
serts that, "Collective contracts, unlike individual employment contracts,
provide substantial protection of individual autonomy of employees."' 162
He views the just cause provisions included in "almost all collective
agreements" as contributing to such protection. 163 He discusses how the
emphasis is on an employee's interest in her job which grows with se-
niority rather than on an employee's interest in privacy or autonomy per
se.164 He writes, "But the result is that personal autonomy obtains sub-
stantial implicit, if not explicit, protection."1 65 Summers concludes:
"The collective agreement gives substantial protection to the employee's
157 Id. at 62 (quoting FMC Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 335, 338 (1966) (Mittenthal,
Arb.)) (emphasis in original).
158 See id.
159 See id. at 56.
160 Id. at 60.
161 See Summers, supra note 44, at 478.
162 Id; cf Yelnosky, supra note 137, at 526. Professor Yelnosky promotes collective
bargaining as a means to protect employees against employers overreaching in imposing ap-
pearance codes. He states that one arbitrator found a no-beard policy in violation of the CBA
"using language that makes clear that a culture of employee autonomy exists in some union
workplaces that is virtually unheard of in the non-union workplace." Id. (discussing Fairmont-
Zarda Dairy, 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 583 (1995) (Rolhik, Arb.)).
163 See Summers, supra note 44, at 478.
164 See id. at 483.
165 Id.
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right of privacy. Arbitrators weigh the employer's business interests
against the employee's privacy interests but require the employer to
show some substantial business need."1 66
He also notes that one of the most widely accepted principles
among arbitrators is that "'what an employee does on his own time is
none of the employer's business.' "167 He implies that there may be an
exception where there is a "concrete showing of a direct effect on the
employer's business." 168
Yet Summers recognizes that "invasions by employer action other
than discipline or discharge go largely uncurbed."' 169 For example, "in-
trusion into an employee's home by telephoto camera" or "intercepting
e-mail are seldom prohibited by collective agreements."' 170 Arbitration is
unlikely to provide a satisfactory remedy for such invasions of privacy
because arbitrators typically do not award monetary damages other than
backpay.171
Thus, Summers's thesis supports the idea that the privacy protec-
tions provided by arbitration decisions, whether explicitly framed as such
or not, provide a starting point for developing an adequate system of
protection for employees' privacy rights.172 One aspect of such a system
should be significant protection for off-duty activities. Summers's sug-
gestion that a "concrete showing of a direct effect" is necessary in order
to impose discipline is supported by many of the decisions reviewed.
Indeed, a review of the recent decisions addressing emerging technology
such as GPS, e-mail, and Internet monitoring can serve as a basis for
fleshing out the types of activities that have such a concrete harmful ef-
fect on an employer.
Summers's explanation also indicates that arbitration decisions
merely serve as a starting point for an adequate framework of protection
because they inadequately compensate employees for privacy invasions
166 Id. at 481.
167 Id. at 478-79 (quoting MARVIN F. HILL & MARK L. KAHN, DISCIPLINE AND Dis-
CHARGE FOR OFF-DUTy MISCONDUCT: WHAT ARE THE ARBITRAL STANDARDS' IN ARBITRA-
TION 1986: CURRENT AND EXPANDING ROLES 121 (Proceed., 39th Ann. Meet., Nat'l Acad. of
Arb. Gladys Gershenfeld ed., 1986)).
168 Id. at 479.
169 Id. at 483.
170 Id.
171 Id.; see also Kim, supra note 12, at 1022. Professor Kim's article focuses on protect-
ing employee privacy in the context of employer drug testing. Kim posits that, "individual
grievances processed under collective bargaining agreements focused on protecting job secur-
ity, rather than redressing any dignitary harm resulting from invasive testing practices." Id.
Kim's explanation is that "lack of attention to workers' privacy is consistent with the fact that
arbitrators rarely award money damages to workers except to compensate for lost wages." Id.
172 Cf. Kim, supra note 12, at 1027. Kim concludes that "unions appear to offer at least
the possibility of mobilizing a collective response to threats of employee privacy." Id.
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which do not result in discipline. 173 Indeed, while a review of the recent
cases suggests that compensation and other types of protections from pri-
vacy invasions, such as an affirmative right to refuse to submit to privacy
invasions, are conceptually recognized by arbitrators, they are not in
widespread use. Nevertheless, an adequate system of protection for em-
ployees' privacy rights would draw upon these concepts to integrate such
safeguards into an effective system to protect employees' privacy rights.
VI. RESEARCH METHODS
In order to discern the law of the shop regarding employee privacy
in the face of emerging technology, searches were performed in the Bu-
reau of National Affairs' (BNA) labor arbitration decisions database for
decisions that addressed privacy and for decisions that addressed four
recent technologies: GPS, e-mail, blogging, and the Internet.
Initially, a search was performed for the word "privacy." This
search disclosed 417 documents, indicating that privacy was indeed ad-
dressed in the labor arbitration decisions. A review of the cases dating
back to 1999 disclosed seventy cases potentially relevant to the issue of
employee privacy from technological monitoring. Thereafter, searches
were performed targeting specific technologies. Cases not explicitly
framed in terms of privacy but that dealt with emergent technologies
might also provide insight as to how to address privacy issues arising out
of such technologies.
GPS was chosen as an emerging technology that monitors employ-
ees' actions while on duty. Searches for the terms "GPS," "global posi-
tioning system," "tracking system," or "computer communications
system" brought up twenty-three cases. Some dated to as early as 1985.
Six cases used the first term, and the earliest of those cases was in 2002,
while the only year with multiple cases was 2007. This suggests that
GPS is beginning to be addressed as a new technology in the workplace
over the past decade.
E-mail was chosen as a relatively new technology that prompts
monitoring of employees' communications in the workplace. A search
for "email," "e-mail," or "electronic mail" revealed 281 documents, all
of which were reviewed. The initial case mentioning e-mail was decided
in 1990. In 1994 there were only three cases, and in 1995 four. By 1998
there were ten cases and by 2000 there were nineteen cases. These find-
173 Cf. id. at 1011. Kim discusses how the early cases brought by unions did focus on
concerns about privacy and human dignity but later cases did not. Kim writes that, "Workers
who felt aggrieved because of the manner in which a test was administered, or by the intru-
siveness of the test itself, could not recover damages for dignitary harms, and those who suf-
fered no tangible job loss were essentially remediless under the collective bargaining system."
Id. at 1029.
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ings suggest that there is significant arbitral precedent involving e-mail
which can serve as a starting point for developing adequate protection of
privacy for employees' personal communications while on-duty.
Blogging was selected as an emerging technology that implicates
employer monitoring of off-duty conduct. But a search for the terms
"blog!" or "blawg!" revealed only one decision. 17 4 While the case does
deal with off-duty conduct, the case does not deal with a blog, as the
term is typically conceived, but rather with posts to MySpace. Addition-
ally, the case is somewhat unusual because the off-duty information
about the employee was not posted by the employee but rather by his
estranged wife. Thus, decisions about blogging are insufficient in num-
ber to serve as a starting point for developing adequate protections from
off-duty monitoring.
In order to locate additional cases potentially dealing with off-duty
monitoring, a search for the terms "internet" or "intranet" was performed
and a search for the terms "web," "webpage," "web page," "website,"
"web site," "homepage," or "home page" was conducted as well. The
former search revealed 104 decisions, which were reviewed back to
those decided in 1999. The latter search retrieved 145 documents, which
also were reviewed back to those decided in 1999. This search located
several cases that dealt with off-duty conduct that can serve as a starting
point, in conjunction with other types of off-duty cases, for developing
adequate protections from off-duty monitoring. This search also located
a large number of cases dealing with on-duty conduct, further supple-
menting the cases that address the use of e-mail.
Finally, a supplemental search aimed at discovering other cases
dealing with decisions addressing privacy in off-duty conduct was con-
ducted for the terms "private" or "privately." This search revealed an
overwhelming number of cases-1,790-and those dating back to 2003
were reviewed.
Only a fraction of arbitration decisions are published. Thus, this
inquiry is not reflective of the universe of arbitration decisions. Nor does
the inquiry look specifically at collective bargaining agreements (CBA),
employer policies, or court decisions, all of which would provide further
insight as to the law of the shop on privacy.
The BNA-published arbitration decisions, however, reflect the law
of the shop and are relied upon by other arbitrators making later deci-
sions. They thus serve as a good starting point for discerning the law of
the shop. Additionally, the concepts used by the arbitrators could be
successfully adapted to the non-union workplace in order to regulate em-
174 See Warren City Bd. of Educ., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 532, 535 (2007) (Skulina,
Arb.).
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ployers' use of technology to monitor employees and to protect employ-
ees' right to privacy.
Of these reviewed cases, eighty-three were more closely reviewed,
sixty-eight of which are cited herein. Fifty-nine are cases challenging
discipline under a just cause provision. In thirty-six of those cases, the
discipline was overturned or reduced. Eight are cases alleging other
types of violations of contractual provisions or past-practice. The griev-
ance was upheld, at least in part, in six of those cases. One is an interest
arbitration decision rejecting a proposal that employees perform routine
maintenance on their assigned computers. Twenty-two of these sixty-
eight cases explicitly frame a relevant issue as one addressing employ-
ees' privacy concerns. 175
VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: THE LAW OF THE SHOP
RECOGNIZES THAT EMPLOYEES HAVE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Arbitral authority recognizes employees' right to privacy. 176 For
instance, in one case the arbitrator states, "There is a common law of the
shop which holds that when an employee is being disciplined the super-
visor should honor the employee's privacy."1 77
Indeed, arbitrators have recognized that, at times, limits must be
placed on the technology that an employer can use in order to protect
employees' privacy concerns. In one case, for example, an arbitrator
concluded that an employer could not unilaterally implement a direct de-
posit pay system, in part because of privacy considerations. 178 While
these cases deal with maintaining information private from co-workers
and third parties rather than from employers, they suggest that limits are
possible and, in certain instances, appropriate. 79 They also suggest that
any policies dealing with maintaining employees' privacy from employer
monitoring and conduct might best be integrated into larger policies ad-
175 These findings coincide with those of Kim, who concludes that, when addressing drug
testing, unions do assert privacy rights but tend to focus on job security. See Kim, supra note
12, at 1011.
176 See, e.g., City of Kalamazoo, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 815, 818-19 (2001) (Daniel,
Arb.) (addressing whether a policy extending benefits to same-sex couples was appropriate
and stating "[a]pplicants need not be homosexual and certainly the city would not inquire as to
any employee's sexual activities-that would be an egregious violation of privacy").
177 Rhodia, Inc., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 455, 464 (2003) (Neas, Arb.).
178 See Fremont Plastic Prods., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 149, 154 (2005) (Franck-
iewicz, Arb.). But see City of Bedford, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1214 (2005) (Skulina, Arb.) (up-
holding mandatory direct deposit).
179 See Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 63 (2003) (O'Conner, Arb.)
(addressing the privacy of medical information).
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dressed toward maintaining privacy of employee information more
generally. 180
The arbitration decisions also indicate that privacy is situational. In
this context, situational privacy means that employees desire to selec-
tively disclose certain information only to certain people and maintain
the information private from others. One arbitrator found an employer's
investigation is inadequate where the employer did not speak to each
employee witness in private. 181 The arbitrator reasoned that an employee
would need privacy before implicating a co-worker. 182 Thus, employees
have some thoughts they should be asked to share only with certain peo-
ple. This idea extends to keeping certain conduct and thoughts private
from their employers. 183
The cases dealing with privacy and the impact of new technology
on employer monitoring of employees suggest twelve safeguards for em-
ployee privacy from employer monitoring: 1) the right to affirmatively
refuse monitoring; 2) notice of monitoring; 3) notice of the particulars of
the monitoring; 4) notice of infractions related to the use of new technol-
ogy; 5) notice of resulting discipline for those infractions; 6) consistent
enforcement of policies relating to technology; 7) confidential review of
information discovered through monitoring; 8) limited collection of in-
formation through technological monitoring; 9) reasonable suspicion of
an infraction before monitoring; 10) assessment of the accuracy and reli-
ability of the information produced by the monitoring; 11) compensation
for a violation of privacy; and 12) restrictions on discipline imposed
based on information gathered as a result of monitoring.
Nevertheless, the protection of employees' privacy is not as system-
atic or robust as would be ideal to provide consistent protection of em-
ployees' rights to privacy. 184 Through systematically grouping these
180 To the extent possible, the protections from employer technological monitoring dis-
cussed in this Article should be integrated or coordinated with overall policies governing
workplace privacy. These would include regulations about gathering information from em-
ployees or about employees by means other than technological monitoring and regulations
governing to whom collected information can be disclosed, including regulations regarding
privacy of medical information.
181 See ESAB Welding & Cutting Prods., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 79, 83 (2000)
(Wolkinson, Arb.).
182 See id. ("One does not have to be a trained investigator to understand that only when
afforded appropriate privacy might employees provide sensitive information incriminating
other co-workers.").
t83 See discussion infra Section VII. C.
184 It is interesting, and ironic, that in one case involving a discharge of an employee for
taking a picture on his phone of a sunset while at work in violation of a rule forbidding
recording devices in the plant, the employer asserted that an underlying reason for the rule was
to protect employees who are "generally very, very sensitive of being recorded." Trane Co.,
124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 673, 674 (2007) (Heekin, Arb.). In another case, an employer
asserted termination of an employee was appropriate in part because he had invaded his super-
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twelve safeguards into potential protection packages depending on the
level of intrusion of the employees' privacy, satisfactory policies protect-
ing employee privacy can be developed. These safeguards, used in vary-
ing combinations, can serve as a starting point for thinking about
workable privacy protections in the American context.
This section mentions the role of collective bargaining in protecting
privacy and suggests potential means for mimicking that protection in the
non-union sector. The section then surveys general arbitral principles
that might be useful in developing protections for employee privacy.
Next, the section describes cases dealing with employees' right to pri-
vacy and right to be free from technological monitoring. It proposes that
the safeguards suggested by these cases can serve as a starting point for
developing an adequate framework for protecting employees' privacy
from technological monitoring. Finally, the section proposes potential
remedies for violations of the proposed privacy protections and discusses
the issue of whether employees should be permitted to waive the pro-
posed protections in return for compensation.
A. Creative Yet Practical Means, Such as Minimal "Floors"185 of
Privacy Protection or Safe-Harbor Policies, Can Be Used to
Mimic Forbidding Employers from Unilaterally Imposing
Policies that Invade Privacy Without Bargaining with the
Union186
Some arbitrators require bargaining with the union before installing
monitoring devices or otherwise invading an employee's privacy, 187
visor's privacy by reading e-mails on his supervisor's work computer. See Monterey County,
117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 897, 900 (2002) (Levy, Arb.). These cases support Craver's sug-
gestion that employers will assert the privacy interests of their employees to further manage-
ment prerogative but deny that employees have any right to privacy for the same end. See
Craver, supra note 12, at 1059.
185 Matthew Finkin, Book Review, 21 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 813, 814 (2000)
(discussing "gap between the French 'floor of rights"' and employer "control of employee
privacy" in the United States).
186 The word "mimic" indicates that, for many reasons, it is not possible to replicate, or
even nearly replicate, the protections provided by the requirement that employer's bargain
with exclusive representatives over working conditions. The level of equality in bargaining
position and the likelihood of enforcement are likely greater in a collective scheme than one
based on individual rights.
187 See, e.g., Lyondell Citgo Ref., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 360, 363 (2004) (Moreland,
IV, Arb.); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1274, 1279 (2002) (Daly, Arb.)
(requiring bargaining to implement restraints on the "fundamental freedom" of a person to
"work where" the person "can and hold a job") (quoting Lowell Sun Publ'g Co., 43 Lab. Arb.
Rep. 273 (BNA) (1964) (Hogan, Arb.)); cf Berkley Sch. Dist., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. 356 (2005)
(Daniel, Arb.) (employer could not install closed circuit televisions in instructional areas be-
cause contract forbid their use, as well as use of any similar surveillance device).
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while others do not.' 88 During mandated bargaining, unions bargain for
safeguards such as notice, verification of accuracy of the photos or other
reports from the monitoring system, or particularized suspicion to
monitor.
In the non-union sector there is, of course, no union with which to
bargain. One possible mechanism for ensuring equivalent types of safe-
guards for non-union situations is to legislate minimum employee pri-
vacy rights. These rights might be enforced through private court action,
an administrative proceeding, mediation and conciliation, or private
arbitration.
Promulgation of safe-harbor policies could also provide such pro-
tection. Similar to the privacy policies that United States companies now
adopt to comply with European privacy laws,' 89 the state or federal gov-
ernment, whether through the legislature or a designated agency, could
develop a set of privacy policies. Providing a range of policies offers
employers with different management policies and cultures the flexibility
of adopting different policies based on needs and fit. If an employer
implemented and complied with one of the promulgated policies, that
would serve as a safe-harbor from any type of invasion of privacy claim
covered by the safe-harbor policies. 190 In other words, an employee
would be unable to bring a privacy claim of the kind addressed by the
policy against an employer who complied with an adopted policy.
188 See, e.g., City of Okmulgee, 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 423, 430 (2007) (Walker,
Arb.) (new policy on use of computers and internet is not contrary to CBA and does not
materially, substantially, and significantly affect the terms and conditions of employment);
Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 257, 262 (2006) (Nicholas, Arb.). But see
California Newspaper Partnerships, 350 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (Sept. 10, 2007) (employer must
bargain with union over policy forbidding use of e-mail accounts to send messages about
union affairs).
189 Because the United States provides an inadequate level of privacy protection, no data
can be transferred from the European Union to the United States unless the involved company
has pursued a safe-harbor option. The company can either certify annually to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce that it "agree[s] to adhere to comparable notice, choice, access and en-
forcement requirements" or can sign "onto standard contractual clauses adopted by the
European Commission to ensure adequate safeguards for personal data transfer." Moldof,
supra note 39, at 10.
190 Another possibility to encourage acceptable privacy practices might be to condition
some privilege, such as access to free high speed internet provided by the community, on
adopting such a policy. This would not recognize employees' right to privacy but would, at
least, tend to encourage recognition of privacy concerns.
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B. Some Limits on Employer Conduct Generally Recognized by
Arbitrators Might Serve as a Starting Point for Developing
Minimal Privacy Protections or Safe-Harbor Policies'9 1
This Article will focus on recommending policies derived from the
concepts specifically addressing privacy concerns discussed below in
Sub-Section C. Nevertheless, some legislatures, courts, administrators,
or even employers may wish to consider incorporating some of the more
generally-recognized arbitral principles as part of a system regulating
employee privacy. 192 Additionally, these principles serve as useful back-
ground for the more detailed discussion of the safeguards protecting pri-
vacy discussed thereafter. 193 Thus, this section briefly discusses some of
the standard principles recognized by arbitrators: reasonable rules, no-
tice, thorough investigation, disparate treatment, progressive discipline,
mitigating circumstances, and the fit between the severity of the infrac-
tion and the resulting discipline.
1. Reasonable Rules
Arbitrators generally conclude that a rule must be "reasonably" re-
lated "to the orderly, efficient and safe operation of the employer's
business."194
191 Some of these concepts are part of the oft-cited seven questions posed by Professor
Dougherty in Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359 (1966), to determine whether
there is just cause. See Sycamore Bd. of Educ., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1588, 1596 n.1
(2007) (Van Pelt, Arb.).
192 For instance, one decision involves a non-union employer who voluntarily adopted
progressive discipline. See Alliedsignal Engines, 106 Lab. Arb Rep. (BNA) 614 (1996) (Ri-
vera, Arb.).
193 While the lead text on labor arbitration, ELKOIRI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION
WORKS (Alan M. Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003), does not contain a section specifically dedicated to
employees' right to privacy from technological monitoring, it does contain relevant informa-
tion in various sections. See, e.g., Privacy, Dignity, and Peace of Mind, 1076; Use of Griev-
ance Procedure Versus Self-Help, 283; "Moonlighting" and Outside Business Interest, 1043;
Personal Appearance: Hair and Clothes, 1046; Fraternization, Intermarriage of Employees,
Employment of Relatives, Married Employees, 1073; Use of Personal Radios, 1085. DiscI-
PLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION (Norman Brand ed., 1998), is also a good source for
information about general principles applied in that context.
194 United Ass'n of Plumbers & Steamfitters, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 710, 712 (2001)
(Wolfson, Arb.); see also e.g., Embarq, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 923, 928 (2007)
(Armendariz, Arb.); Beverage Mktg. Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1388, 1391 (2005)
(Fagan, Arb.); JBM, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1688, 1699 (2005) (Rosen, Arh.); Georgia
Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. 936, 946 (2006) (Nolan, Arb.); Albertson's Inc., 115 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 886, 891 (2000) (Gangle, Arb.).
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2. Notice
Arbitrators commonly endorse the idea of notice, be it notice of
rules,195 notice of monitoring,196 notice of potential level of discipline,'
97
or notice within a limited time period that an employee has committed an
infraction. 198 Typically, to provide reasonable notice of monitoring or
prohibited conduct, a rule must be clear.' 99
3. Thorough Investigation
Arbitrators generally consider whether any investigation of an em-
ployee's misconduct that led to discipline was adequately thorough. 200
4. Disparate Treatment
Arbitrators commonly consider whether other employees who have
committed the same types of infractions received lesser penalties.
20 1
5. Progressive Discipline
Arbitrators commonly endorse the idea of progressive discipline.
202
Progressive discipline punishes an initial infraction less severely than a
195 See, e.g., Trane Co., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 673, 674 (2007) (Heekin, Arb.); Syca-
more Bd. of Educ., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1597; Georgia Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) at 947; Cingular Wireless, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 438, 441 (2005) (Nolan,
Arb.); Saint Gobain Norpro, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 960, 967 (2001) (Fullmer, Arb.);
Conneaut Sch. Dist., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 909, 914 (1995) (Talarico, Arb.).
196 See, e.g., Georgia Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 944 (arbitrators concluded
that policy "expressly warned" that the company would monitor electronic communications
despite fact that only quoted policy language simply "reserved the right" to monitor).
197 See, e.g., id.; Beverage Mktg. Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1391; Penn Window
Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 298, 304 (2004) (Dissen, Arb.) ("If an employee is not in-
formed of rules and the consequences for their violation, his due process rights are signifi-
cantly compromised."); Univ. of Mich., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1394, 1399 (2000)
(Sugerman, Arb.) (termination inappropriate when employer failed to notify grievant that fail-
ing to terminate personal calls would lead to termination).
198 See, e.g., City of El Paso, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 691, 693 (2006) (Greer, Arb.)
(180-day period for disciplinary action for non-criminal violations); Union-Scioto Local Bd. of
Educ., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1071, 1078 (2004) (Cohen, Arb.) (notice inadequate to
inform grievant of nature of infraction).
199 See, e.g., Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 26, 34 (2003) (Daly, Arb.).
200 See, e.g., Embarq, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 923, 928 (2007) (Armendariz, Arb.);
Beverage Mktg. Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1391; ESAB Welding & Cutting Prods.,
115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 83.
201 See, e.g., Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 262; Beverage Mktg.
Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1391; Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 35
(reasoning that downloading child pornography is more serious than downloading other por-
nography); Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. 897, 900 (2002) (Levy, Arb.) (disparate
treatment where those who sent inappropriate and sexually explicit e-mails to employee were
not disciplined); Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 271, 276-77, 279 (2001)
(Goodstein, Arb.); PPG Indus., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. 833, 844 (1999) (Dichter, Arb).
202 See, e.g., Orange County, Fla., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 460, 465 (2007) (Smith,
Arb.) ("The credibility of the whole grievance and arbitration system hinges on review of the
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later infraction of the same type. 203 It "affords an employee the opportu-
nity to correct his or her behavior before more severe discipline, up to
and including termination, is imposed.' '2° Many arbitrators endorse pro-
gressive discipline for misuse of company equipment, including com-
puter systems. 205  They also endorse progressive discipline for
infractions discovered by monitoring devices such as GPS. 20 6
6. Mitigating Circumstances, Including Seniority
Arbitrators commonly consider aggravating and mitigating factors
to determine whether the level of discipline is appropriate. Common
mitigators include honesty and acceptance of responsibility for infrac-
tions,207 long-time service, 20 8 a record that is clear of previous disci-
pline, 20 9 and any awards or commendations. 210
While some employers may protest reliance on seniority as opposed
to merit, seniority does indicate an ability to conduct oneself in the work-
place in a manner that complies with the employer's work rules.2 '
Moreover, while employers may be concerned that employees are hiding
penalty to assure that it is in conformity with the guiding precept of progressive or corrective,
rather than punitive, discipline."); Sycamore Bd. of Educ., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1588,
1598 (2007) (Van Pelt, Arb.); Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb Rep. (BNA) at 262; Mont.
Child & Family Servs., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 656, 662 (2006) (Reeves, Arb.); Cingular
Wireless, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 438, 441 (2005) (Nolan, Arb.).
203 See Orange County, Fla., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 465; JBM, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1688, 1698 (2005) (Rosen, Arb.) (discussing progressive discipline).
204 JBM, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1698.
205 See, e.g., Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 262; Ga. Power Co., 123
Lab. Arb. Rep. 936, 947 (2006); County of Sacramento, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 699, 702
(2003) (Riker, Arb.); Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 271; Snohomish
County, 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1, 7 (2000) (Levak, Arb.); see also Nw. Publ'ns, 114 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 761, 765 (2000) (Bognanno, Arb.) (reducing five day suspension for working on
photo of nude wife on computer and showing image to co-workers, including one who was
offended, to warning/counseling).
206 See, e.g., Orange County, Fla., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 465.
207 See, e.g., Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 897, 900 (2002) (Levy, Arb.);
Shawnee County, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1659, 1663 (2007) (Daly, Arb.).
208 See, e.g., Mont. Child and Family Servs., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 662; Ga.
Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 947; Beverage Mktg. Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) at 1391; King Soopers, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 501, 505-06 (2004) (Sass,
Arb.); Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 900 ; Quaker Oats Co., 116 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 211, 215 (2001) (Marino, Arb.); Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
at 274; PPG Indus. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 844.
209 See, e.g., Ga. Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 947; Mont. Child and Family
Servs., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 662; King Soopers, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at
505-06; Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 900; Quaker Oats Co., 116 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) at 215; Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 274; PPG Indus. Inc.,
113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 842.
210 See, e.g., Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb Rep. (BNA) at 262.
211 See Ga. Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 947 ("[L]ong service without previ-
ous discipline strongly suggests that the employee can learn from his mistakes."); King
Soopers, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 506 ("[Ylears of good service show that an em-
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behaviors that harm the employer, the performance of long-term employ-
ees likely would have suffered over time had they been hiding poor be-
havior all along. Thus, it seems fair to consider longevity of employment
in cases where a violation of the employees' privacy leads to discipline.
7. Severity of Discipline Fits Infraction
Arbitrators often consider whether the level of discipline is appro-
priate in light of the seriousness of the infraction.212
C. Arbitral Concepts Particular to Protecting Employees' Right to
Privacy and to be Free of Technological Monitoring Can Serve
as a Starting Framework for Regulation or Safe-Harbor
Policies
Arbitration decisions serve as a good starting point for developing a
spectrum of protection from monitoring based on the intrusiveness of the
invasion. The least protection is afforded from technologies that monitor
on-duty actions, such as GPS or video cameras, albeit systematically,
completely, and in a recorded manner.213 Intermediate protection is af-
forded from those that record information that implicates other human
rights, such as the right to speak or to associate, 214 and the greatest pro-
tection is afforded from those that monitor off-duty behavior. Indeed,
arbitration decisions address technologies, such as GPS and video sur-
veillance, that monitor an employee's outward actions with only inciden-
tal recording of conversations or images. Arbitration decisions also
address monitoring of employees' computer usage, which focuses on the
content of employees' thoughts and communications. Additionally, arbi-
tration decisions address employees' behavior in their private lives
outside of the workplace.
Arbitration decisions address both surreptitious and open monitor-
ing of these different types of employee behavior, and some decisions
even recognize an affirmative right to privacy. The sub-sections below
survey the decisions addressing the spectrum of privacy intrusions, com-
ment on the decisions and tease out the various safeguards for employee
ployee can conform to the rules and that whatever they did to warrant discipline was some-
thing of an aberration rather than their normal way of behaving.").
212 See, e.g., Embarq, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 923, 928 (2007) (Armendariz, Arb.).
213 See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 925 ("One might argue ... that observation via
closed-circuit television camera is worse than the human-on-human snooping to which Selmi
compared it if only because a video image of a face can be re-wound and replayed, edited,
enlarged into grotesque nostril-boring expansion, whereas the human snoop gets nothing to
exploit beyond his glance.").
214 See Craver, supra note 12, at 1076 (suggesting that monitoring activities is less intru-
sive than monitoring communications where employees "have the right to expect their appro-
priate exchanges with coworkers and outside person will remain confidential" and proposing a
monitoring system where confidentiality from managers is maintained).
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privacy proposed by arbitrators, suggest extensions of the safeguards,
and then suggest various frameworks combining those safeguards that
would adequately protect an employee's privacy right from each level of
intrusion.
The first sub-section discusses the concept of a negative or affirma-
tive right to privacy and proposes an affirmative right to privacy as an
appropriate safeguard for protecting an employee's privacy. The second
sub-section discusses monitoring, both open and surreptitious, of em-
ployees' actions while on-duty. The third sub-section addresses monitor-
ing of employees' computer use as an example of monitoring of
employees' thoughts and communications on-duty. Finally, the last sub-
section addresses monitoring of and discipline for off-duty behavior.
1. Affirmative or Negative Right to Privacy
Some arbitration decisions suggest that an employee has an affirma-
tive right to refuse to permit an employer from invading the employee's
privacy. These include decisions shielding off-duty behavior from em-
ployer mandate or inquiry,215 and a decision recognizing an employee's
right to assert privacy as an exception to the rule that an employee, when
working, must obey an employer's directive.216
a. Affirmative Right to Privacy For Off-Duty Behavior
Two decisions suggest that there is an affirmative right to privacy in
one's off-duty behavior. In one case, the arbitrator rather fully embraced
the thesis underlying Selmi's proposal that off-duty behavior should be
private from the employer.217 The arbitrator held that the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement prohibited an employer from implementing a system
under which all maintenance employees must wear pagers, respond
within fifteen minutes of being called, and report to work within one
hour.218 The arbitrator concluded:
It must be recognized, that the imposition of wearing a
pager while off-duty infringes upon an employee's right
to their [sic.] peaceable enjoyment of life and privacy
during self-governed hours beyond the scrutiny and con-
trol of the employer, particularly when the employee is
not volunteering for the inconvenience nor being com-
pensated for the intrusion. These are the issues to be
215 See, e.g., Shawnee County, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1659, 1663 (2007) (Daly,
Arb.); Lyondell Citgo Ref., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 360, 364 (2004) (Moreland, Arb.).
216 See Albertson's Inc., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 886 (2000) (Gangle, Arb.).
217 See Lyondell Citgo Ref., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 364.
218 See id. at 365.
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appropriately addressed and conceded only after good
faith collective bargaining, which did not occur.219
The arbitrator ordered the employer to rescind the policy and any
resulting discipline. 220 He ordered that "said disciplined employee(s)
shall be made whole in all respects, including wage loss, back pay, job
demotion, blemished work record, promotion denial, seniority, or any
other employment related benefit(s) loss directly attributable to any dis-
ciplinary action stemming from the violation of the on call pager pol-
icy. '' 221 Thus, the arbitrator recognized that employees have a right to
privacy from employer monitoring while off-duty. The opinion appears
to endorse an affirmative right to refuse to wear monitoring devices
while off-duty.2 22 It erases discipline and any other negative action re-
sulting from affirmatively refusing to comply with the policy.
Furthermore, while the decision does not provide compensation for
the invasion of privacy itself as one of the remedies, it suggests that, as a
general proposition, employees should be compensated for invasions of
privacy, at least pertaining to off-duty conduct.22 3 Compensation for an
invasion of privacy is, thus, another recognized safeguard, and this could
easily extend to providing a remedy for violations of privacy.
Another case implies that there is an affirmative right to privacy for
off-duty conduct, even where that conduct is documented on a publicly-
available web page.22 4 The grievant, a sheriff's deputy, attended a dance
bar, and the bar posted a photo of many people dancing, including the
grievant, on its website.22 5 The grievant called in late to work the next
day, and management asked her about her reasons for being late. 22 6
When she was terminated for lying about the reasons why she was tardy,
the arbitrator reasoned that no rule prohibited the grievant from attending
219 Id. at 364.
220 See id. at 365.
221 Id.
222 See id.; see also Lake Wash. Sch. Dist., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1081, 1087 (2004)
(Henner, Arb.) (suggesting that if a teacher who was subject to limitations on spending time
with children outside of work hours had sought permission to spend time with the children of
the woman he was dating and the employer had refused permission, "he might even have been
entitled to refuse to comply with an unreasonable denial").
223 See id. at 361.
224 See Shawnee County, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1659, 1661 (2007) (Daly, Arb.).
This is a public sector case, but, like all other public sector cases cited in this Article (unless
explicitly mentioned otherwise), it does not involve constitutional or other issues that would
differentiate it from private sector cases. As discussed below, there are, however, many other
cases which find it appropriate to monitor an employee's off-duty conduct in certain circum-
stances. See discussion infra Section VII C.4.b.
225 See Shawnee County, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1659, 1661 (2007) (Daly, Arb.).
226 See id. at 1662.
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the bar and that officers were not required to report reasons for
tardiness. 227
The undercurrent of the decision suggests that the arbitrator be-
lieved it was inappropriate for the employer to inquire about the griev-
ant's off-duty conduct, even if her photo was publicly available. The
decision suggests that the employee's right to refuse to divulge personal
reasons for tardiness extends so far as to excuse any lies about her off-
duty life.228 Thus, the opinion suggests an affirmative right to refuse to
disclose personal information, such as off-duty behavior, to an employer.
Such a right might be extended to provide a safeguard from violation of
privacy protections whether involving off-duty behavior or not.
b. Affirmative Right to Privacy for On-Duty Behavior
There is an interesting discussion about whether employees must,
when on duty, submit to privacy invasions and grieve later.229 In one
case, for instance, the arbitrator found it appropriate for an employee to
refuse to stick out her tongue. 230 The supervisor desired to determine
whether she was wearing a tongue ring in violation of company rules.2 31
The arbitrator reasoned that the principle "obey now, grieve later" is sub-
ject to certain exceptions. 232 These exceptions include refusing to "per-
form an illegal, immoral or dangerously unsafe act" or an act that would
humiliate or violate the privacy right of the employee. 233 The arbitrator
reasoned that arbitrators recognized the latter justification in drug testing
cases. 234 The arbitrator further reasoned that "[i]t was unreasonably in-
trusive, therefore, to require that she open her mouth and extend her
tongue, so that [the supervisor] could check her private, personal
space." 235
Thus, the decision recognizes an affirmative right to privacy in the
right of an on-duty employee to refuse to submit to privacy invasions by
her employer. And while bodily integrity is certainly an important aspect
of privacy, it is arguably equally invasive to monitor someone's private
thoughts or the images the person chooses to view as it is to view some-
227 See id. at 1663.
228 See id. at 1664.
229 See DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION 165 (Norman Brand ed. 1998)
("There is a line of cases finding discipline to have been improperly imposed in circumstances
where the employer's action conflicts with the individual's right to privacy.").
230 See Albertson's Inc., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 886, 893 (2000) (Gangle, Arb.).
231 See id. at 889.
232 See id. at 892.
233 Id.; see Yelnosky, supra note 137, at 527-28 (discussing Albertson's as an example of
a case protecting unreasonable application of a reasonable rule regulating employee
appearance).
234 See Albertson's Inc., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 893.
235 See id.
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one's tongue. Certainly an employee could suffer more emotionally
from an employer gaining access to information that disclosed an un-
wanted pregnancy, a same-sex relationship, or a child out-of-wedlock
than from simply being required to stick out a tongue. Thus, extending
this safeguard as part of a framework to address employer monitoring of
employees, at a minimum to protect on-duty communications, would be
appropriate.
Many arbitrators, however, would probably take the position that an
employee must obey an order that threatens the employee's privacy and
grieve the violation later.236 For instance, one decision exempts only
safety threats that would result in physical injury to the employee from
the rule to grieve later.237 The arbitrator upheld the employee's dis-
charge for refusal to share photos on his private phone with his em-
ployer.238 The only other misconduct the grievant engaged in was using
his private property during his break period while in a smoking area to
photograph a sunset.239 He thereby violated a rule prohibiting using re-
cording devices on plant property. 240 The arbitrator did intimate that if
the employee had testified as to the harm that would have resulted from
sharing the photos with management, the outcome may have been
different. 241
Such a position indicates that employees have no affirmative right
to privacy. They cannot assert their privacy and keep it inviolate from
employers. Rather, employees only have negative privacy rights. They
can assert that employers have violated their privacy after-the-fact and
can thus seek a remedy for the invasion.
Yet it is difficult to believe that taking a picture of a sunset while on
company property grants an employer permission to view an employee's
private photographs. The obvious harm is that employers are forcing
employees to disclose private personal information. A means of proving
harm beyond that is difficult to conceive. Certainly an employee should
not have more of a privacy right because the photographs would disclose
sexual or other generally frowned-upon photographs. Additionally, an
employer who has no reasonable suspicion that there are pictures of com-
pany property or employees has no grounds upon which to trample an
employee's privacy rights. 242
236 See Trane Co., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 673, 677 (2007) (Heekin, Arb.).
237 See id. at 676.
238 See id. at 677.
239 See id. at 674.
240 See id.
241 See id. at 677.
242 Moreover, it is difficult to believe that termination is the appropriate discipline for
such a refusal. Privacy seems like a significant mitigating circumstance with respect to the
finding of insubordination. Under principles of progressive discipline, discussed above, less
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Instead of recognizing only a negative right to privacy, an employer
can adequately protect employees' rights by recognizing an affirmative
right of privacy as one safeguard appropriately used in conjunction with
others. This is particularly true in a non-union setting where there is no
union-representative or grievance process to challenge a privacy invasion
after-the-fact.
For instance, an employee with photos on a phone might have an
affirmative right to refuse disclosure unless other safeguards are met.
These safeguards might include using a designated non-management em-
ployee who will review the contents, keep the information confidential,
and, if possible, review only information time-dated as being collected
during times the employee was at work. Disclosure from that employee
to management should result only if the photographs reviewed indicate
that the particular, significant, and concrete work-related misconduct for
which the employee performed the search had taken place.
2. Monitoring of Employees' Actions While on Duty
This section discusses the monitoring of employees' actions while
on duty. First, it discusses open monitoring of employees' on-duty con-
duct. Next, it discusses surreptitious monitoring. Each sub-section sets
out the range of arbitrators' views on the appropriateness of such moni-
toring and suggests frameworks that would provide the adequate minimal
protection needed for such monitoring. Finally, the section discusses in-
suring the accuracy and reliability of gathered information.
a. Open Monitoring of Employees' On-Duty Conduct
Two arbitration decisions suggest two appropriate safeguards for vi-
olation of employee privacy from employer technological monitoring of
the employee's actions during work-time. These safeguards are notice of
monitoring and notice of the infractions that the monitoring is designed
to prevent.
In one decision, a GPS disclosed that an employee had driven an
employer-owned vehicle to his home for lunch.243 There was no chal-
lenge to the use of the GPS, of which the employees were well-aware, on
privacy or any other grounds. Significantly, however, the arbitrator did
not uphold the discipline because, among other reasons, no policy pro-
vided the employee notice that driving home was prohibited. 244 In an-
other decision, a GPS disclosed that an employee had misrepresented the
discipline would certainly seem sufficient to prevent the employee from taking photographs in
the future while on plant property. See supra Section VII.B.5.
243 See Orange County, Ha., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 463.
244 See id. at 465.
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time spent working at customer sites.245 Again, there was no challenge
to the use of the GPS, of which the employees were well-aware. 246 The
discipline in this case was, however, upheld, in part because the grievant
had been warned about his behavior and falsifying time records.247
Indeed, notice of monitoring provides an important safeguard for
employees' right to privacy. Notice does not interfere with an em-
ployer's ability to ensure that the employees are performing their duties,
even when they work off-site or when assessing the employee's output is
difficult (such as when the employee self-reports completion of work at a
customer location). 248 Moroever, employees understand that their move-
ments are monitored and, consistent with the theory of selective disclo-
sure, employees will not take action to disclose private information to the
employer.249
Equally important, notice must be provided with respect to the types
of actions that, if discovered via the monitoring, will result in disci-
pline. 250 The purpose of the monitoring is not to catch the employees in
bad acts of which the employer has no suspicion. Rather, in this context,
it is simply to ensure efficiency and quality work-product. 25 1 Thus, em-
ployees should be on notice not only of the quantity and quality of work
expected but also of other actions which might result in discipline, such
as traveling to their homes.
Assuming that the monitoring is only during work-time, if these
minimal protections are satisfied, only one further safeguard will be nec-
essary: some assurance of the accuracy and reliability of the records of
monitoring.25 2 While the permanence of GPS records makes it simpler
for an employer to "check-in" on an employee, and the constant record-
keeping of every movement may be somewhat oppressive, the monitor-
ing of on-duty conduct is not so intrusive as to necessitate further
safeguards.
Additionally, periodic management check-ups of reports, even with-
out a reasonable suspicion of particularized wrongdoing, is permissive
because employees are unlikely to be engaged in conduct that they legiti-
mately wish to keep private from their employer that would be captured
by GPS monitoring of on-duty actions. An employee might stop some-
245 See Embarq, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 923, 930, 931 (2007) (Armendariz, Arb.).
246 See id. at 924.
247 See id. at 931-32.
248 See id. at 924 (explaining that employee worked at customers' premises without su-
pervision and also self-reported time worked).
249 There must be evidence of actual notice or employee acknowledgment of receipt of a
written policy. See Orange County, Fla., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 465.
250 See id.
251 See id. at 460.
252 See infra Section VII.C.2.c.
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE
where private, such as to pick up medication, but this type of privacy
invasion is less likely to occur than when an employer is monitoring
personal communications.25 3 And while employees may be lulled into a
false suspicion that employers are not checking on their actions, periodi-
cally checking an employees' records is unlikely to seriously intrude on
private conduct.254
On the other hand, some would take the position that noticed tech-
nological monitoring of on-duty conduct is an invasion of privacy, even
with the minimal safeguards suggested. 255 New York City taxi-cab driv-
ers vigorously resisted installation of a GPS in their cabs, and Bernstein
suggests that she wishes others would have pushed more for privacy
rights with respect to monitoring of on-duty activities.2 56 Employers
may not need to monitor employees' actions, even when working off-
site, because they should be able to tell from the employee's work prod-
uct whether he or she is performing job duties adequately.25 7 Even when
an employee is self-reporting, telephone calls to clients or customers to
ascertain their level of satisfaction would be equally effective and less
invasive in terms of the employees' right to privacy. One might even
protest that using such monitoring devices is equivalent to scientific
management, or Taylorism; it may increase efficiency but does so at too
significant a human cost.258 These concerns would provide an adequate
basis for including some additional safeguards in protective legislation or
policies.2 5 9
253 See Embarq, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 930, 932. In this case, a new supervisor
was conducting a routine review of GPS reports which led her to investigate prior GPS reports.
See id. at 930.
254 Although GPS can in some ways be more intrusive than video surveillance because its
mobility enables it to record every action, in some ways it is less invasive because it does not
photograph the person's actions for posterity.
255 See Finkin, supra note 21, at 503-04 (asserting that "the additional features of tech-
nology that make it more pervasive, all-seeing and all-knowing, never forgetting (or forgiv-
ing), become legally irrelevant" despite the fact that a "company could scarcely have assigned
a supervisor to each employee to observe (and record) his or her every motor movement ... at
every moment throughout the work day").
256 See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 925 ("One might argue ... that observation via
closed-circuit television camera is worse than the human-on-human snooping to which Selmi
compared it if only because a video image of a face can be re-wound and replayed, edited,
enlarged into grotesque nostril-boring expansion, whereas the human snoop gets nothing to
exploit beyond his glance.").
257 For instance, many lawyers prefer to be judged on output rather than a log of "billable
hours."
258 See Sprague, supra note 96, at 1.
259 For instance, a policy could reasonably require consistent enforcement of the monitor-
ing and rules governing infractions, reasonable suspicion of a particularized wrongdoing
before monitoring, trying other methods of enforcing rules before implementing GPS monitor-
ing, or compensation for an invasion of privacy.
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b. Surreptitious Surveillance of On-Duty Conduct
One decision suggests that surreptitious use of a GPS is generally
unwarranted.2 60 The company suspected the employee, who worked off-
site, of not being at work during work hours because when a manager
discovered the employee was absent, the employee reported being in his
car using his cell phone.26' The company thus installed a GPS system
into the company vehicles of employees who worked off-site.2 62 The
arbitrator reasoned that the company failed to fulfill its obligations to the
grievant when it used the GPS without notifying employees of the sys-
tem and of "the consequences of abuse of company time. '263 The deci-
sion implies that notice of the GPS system would not detract from the
purposes of tracking employees and improving productivity. 264
Indeed, one reasonable framework of privacy protection would be to
require that all surveillance of on-duty activity be performed pursuant to
the safeguards discussed above in Sub-Section VII.C.2.a. While, as dis-
cussed below, this framework might limit employers' ability in certain
instances to verify wrongdoing or discover who committed an infraction,
it would generally enable them to monitor employees and to thereby pre-
vent infractions from occurring.
However, another arbitrator did not object to surreptitious surveil-
lance of an employee's conduct while on duty, even when the surveil-
lance captured content that the employee was viewing. 265 The arbitrator
implied that "testimonial or documentary evidence obtained through a
nonconsensual search" is appropriate "'so long as the methods employed
are not excessively shocking to the conscience of a reasonable per-
son .... ' "266 The employer had printouts evidencing that an employee
had used a computer for personal reasons without authorization in viola-
tion of a company rule. Thus, the employer set up a camera to capture
photos of the computer misuse. The arbitrator admitted the photos that
were intended to capture the misuse of the computer but ultimately cap-
tured other conduct, including viewing of what appeared to be porno-
graphic digital versatile/video disks (DVDs), which violated company
policy.
Another case suggests that surreptitious monitoring is appropriate
when there is a known violation but no knowledge of who has engaged
260 See Beverage Mktg. Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1391.
261 See id. at 1389.
262 See id.
263 Id. at 1391.
264 See id. at 1388.
265 See Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 262.
266 Id. at 260 n.2 (quoting DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION 337 (Norman
Brand ed., 1998)).
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in the violation.267 The arbitrator upheld discipline of an employee who
had been captured smoking, in violation of the hospital employer's rules,
by a web-cam video device.2 68 The arbitrator did not address the lack of
notice to employees of the hidden camera.269
The "excessively shocking to the conscience standard," when cou-
pled with a non-particularized search, would condone almost unlimited
surreptitious surveillance of employees at the workplace. Yet, if the goal
of surveillance is to monitor productivity, there is no necessity that it be
secret from the employees.
If, on the other hand, the goal is to verify wrongdoing, then surrepti-
tious monitoring would be unnecessary when sufficient proof of wrong-
doing already exists. In the former case, for instance, the employer
already possessed print-outs indicating an infraction on the employee's
part. Employees should not live in fear that they will be singled out for
surreptitious surveillance because of a workplace infraction.
If on the other hand, the employer's goal is to verify a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing, 270 such as in a case where a co-worker made
an allegation,271 or to determine who has engaged in a known infraction,
such as when a manager smells cigarette smoke, then surreptitious sur-
veillance of on-duty conduct might be appropriate. In such instances, a
number of other safeguards, in addition to the requirement of a reasona-
ble suspicion, can be used to ensure adequate protection of an em-
ployee's privacy. Additionally, the quality of the evidence, discussed
below in Sub-Section VII.C.2.c, is an important safeguard.
For instance, an employer might provide notice that it will monitor
when it has a reasonable suspicion to do so. The notice should explain
what constitutes a reasonable suspicion, such as a statement from a co-
worker or evidence of an infraction that is not attributable to a specific
individual. An employer should also notify employees of the types of
267 See Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 949 (2006) (Coyne, Arb.).
This is a public sector case and to some extent the public nature of the employer did contribute
to the decision.
268 See id. at 953.
269 See id.
270 Cf Albertson's Inc., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 886 (holding that there was no
reasonable suspicion proved where supervisors relied on rumors that employee was wearing
her tongue ring but did not see "silver or gold-colored flashing in her mouth" or observe her
putting her hand across her mouth when speaking to them; direction to stick out tongue
inappropriate).
271 See Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 26 (explaining that employer audited
grievant's computer usage for approximately twenty-day period when co-worker anonymously
complained that grievant was viewing child pornography). Arguably an anonymous complaint
would not rise to the level of creating a reasonable suspicion. Cf Chevron Prods. Co., 116
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 278 (implicitly questioning appropriateness of relying on complaints
of inappropriate e-mail to launch investigation of employee's e-mail and terminate him based
upon findings when those complaining are not identified).
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infractions that will be monitored. Employers should consistently en-
force such a policy so that employees know that periodic surreptitious
monitoring takes place.
Alternatively, an employer might be permitted to monitor when it
has a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing and has exhausted other meth-
ods of verification or discovery, such as visual observation or inquiries of
employees, before resorting to surreptitious surveillance. 272 In such an
instance, providing a compensatory remedy to the employee for the inva-
sion of her privacy would be an additional appropriate safeguard because
of the surreptitious nature of the monitoring.
273
c. The Quality of the Evidence
Arbitrators recognize that documentary evidence of surveillance
must be assessed according to the quality of the photograph or report and
in light of other circumstantial evidence.274 In one case, for instance, the
arbitrator found that a photograph did not prove the grievant was mastur-
bating, as asserted by management, when considered in the light of the
grievant's credible testimony to the contrary. 275 In another case, the ar-
bitrator concluded that "grainy" black-and-white photos were not
enough, standing on their own, to prove the misconduct. 276 But, in light
of management's credible testimony, the photos were sufficient proof.
277
GPS reports are treated similarly. In one case, the reports did not
establish a time-line of the grievant's work day.27 8 But they did suffi-
ciently establish a conflict between the time logged by the grievant as
spent at customers' premises and the time actually spent at the custom-
ers' premises. 279
One potential way to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the infor-
mation collected, upon which discipline is based, is to provide employees
the right to review and contest the information. 280 In fact, general arbi-
tral principles providing an employee the opportunity to respond to alle-
272 Each of these has considerable drawbacks as they are unlikely to catch the violation
and may notify the violator to switch to a different area or method. Then again, it may put the
violator on notice to stop, which is the desired result.
273 To the extent the surveillance includes an auditory component-capturing conversa-
tions-it is more appropriately governed by the frameworks discussed in the next section.
274 See Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 262.
275 See id. (explaining that the grievant asserted he was cleaning a boil).
276 See Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 951.
277 See id.
278 See Embarq, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 930.
279 See id. at 930, 931.
280 European law requires that employees be provided a copy of the information gathered
by monitoring. See, e.g., Council and European Parliament Directive 95/46/EC, Recitals 2,
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/law/
indexen.htm.
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gations of misdeeds support such a solution.281 Indeed, in one case, an
arbitrator found that the employer's failure to review video surveillance
of the employee and provide the employee an opportunity to respond
provided one reason for overturning the employee's dismissal.282
3. Monitoring of Employees' Computer Usage
This sub-section addresses monitoring of employees' computer us-
age, as an example of monitoring of employees' thoughts and communi-
cations on-duty. Monitoring of the content of employees' e-mail most
obviously falls in the category of monitoring employees' thoughts and
communications.
Monitoring the types of websites visited by particular employees
also relatively clearly monitors employees' thoughts. In some ways,
such monitoring is similar to monitoring an on-duty off-site employee's
travel because it captures instances when the person stops at a "place"
that is not work-related. But monitoring website use is much more likely
than monitoring actions to disclose personal non-business related
thoughts or conduct. There is wide discretion in the number and types of
websites an employee might visit while working. For this reason, moni-
toring of website usage is addressed by the framework proposed in this
section. Additionally, one unitary policy governing computer usage is
more readily understandable for employees than two different ones.283
This section discusses personal use of company computers, employ-
ees' right to privacy when using a company computer for personal rea-
sons, types of employee uses that are appropriately prohibited by
employers, open monitoring of employee computer usage, surreptitious
monitoring of employee computer usage, and discipline for computer us-
age. While it finds that arbitrators sometimes uphold rules prohibiting
personal use of company computers, it proposes that the better default
position is that employees should not be prohibited from using computers
for personal reasons. It then outlines types of personal use which an
281 See Bud Indus. Inc., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. 908, 914 (BNA) (2007) (Miles, Arb.) ("It is
generally recognized in the arbitral arena that in order to satisfy industrial due process, an
employee 'must be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her side of the case' before
being disciplined.") (quoting ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 193, at 967, 969); Penn Win-
dow Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 303 ("[J]ust cause requires that employees against
whom management is considering discipline first be allowed a meaningful opportunity to re-
fute the allegations made against him (sic.), or explain or excuse his conduct.").
282 See Bud Indus. Inc., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 914.
283 Monitoring of only the number of e-mails or websites viewed would have less of a
tendency to reveal personal thoughts, communications, or conduct. To the extent the technol-
ogy is available and employers are interested in that type of monitoring, it could be appropri-
ately governed by the frameworks discussed in the former section. Because it is most
expedient, however, to treat all monitoring of computer use in one section, all such monitoring
is addressed herein.
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employer might legitimately prohibit and suggests certain safeguards for
monitoring solicitation and messages disrespectful of management. Next
it addresses excessive computer use. Finally, the section proposes a
framework to adequately protect employees' privacy from both open
monitoring and surreptitious monitoring, including the safeguard of miti-
gating discipline due to the private nature of behavior.
a. Personal Use of Company Computers
Some arbitrators uphold employer rules forbidding personal use of
company computers so long as progressive discipline is followed.284 For
instance, in one case, an arbitrator upheld a termination when the em-
ployee's own conduct of printing personal e-mails led to the
discipline. 285
Yet in today's typical workplace, forbidding personal use of com-
pany computers appears out of sync with modem workplace reality.
Many workplaces are computerized and many employees, whether pro-
fessional or not, have access to computers, including one specifically
designated for their use. 286 Additionally, many employees spend more
time at work than before. 287 This necessitates occasional performance of
personal tasks on work time, such as answering an e-mail. Employees
also increasingly spend time at home working.2 88 Thus it seems only fair
that employees, especially when salaried, should spend a minimum
amount of time at work performing personal tasks.289 Moreover, many
employees have "down-time" at work, such as a receptionist who has
284 See, e.g., Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 262; A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1371, 1375 (2004) (Nathan, Arb.) (upholding termination
where employees were "repeatedly advised against using the computer for personal business
and especially not to use it to download or transmit pornography"); Alliedsignal Engines, 106
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 614 (1996) (Rivera, Arb.) (upholding rule at non-union employer
prohibiting distributing written material via e-mail system but reducing termination, for this
violation and others, to last-chance agreement); City of El Paso, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
691, 695, 696 (2006) (Greer, Arb.); Conneaut Sch. Dist., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 914
(where rule is enforced, employer may appropriately preclude employees from using the com-
puter and e-mail system for personal reasons, including exchanging recipes with co-workers).
-See also related discussion on limiting computer use to non-work time, infra Section
VII.C.3.d.
285 See Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 262.
286 See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1373 (describing production
process where "[miuch, if not most, of the production process involves the use of computers"
and maintenance shop containing two information terminals used by maintenance employees);
Hirsch, supra note 97, at 274 ("A 2003 survey estimated that forty perceni of all workers used
the Internet or e-mail at work."); Finkin, supra note 21, at 474 & n.17 ("A 1999 survey indi-
cated that a third of employees spend time surfing the Net while at work").
287 See Sprague, supra note 96, at 27 & n.219; Gely & Bierman, supra note 53, at 76.
288 See Sprague, supra note 96, at 27 & n.219.
289 Cf Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 30, at 891 (discussing how the French legal institu-
tion, Le Forum des droits sur l'Internet, concludes that "it is only fair" to permit employees to
use the Internet at work for personal use because the "employer benefits from having his
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completed the filing and is waiting for the next call, or a parking attend-
ant waiting for the next vehicle to drive in.2 90 Using a computer during
down-time does not detract from the employee's work any more than
reading a book would.
Preventing employees from using a computer on the logic that it
takes away from work-time does not withstand scrutiny.29' Most people
can spend a short time at work doing personal business without any im-
pact on their work performance. If an employee is spending excessive
time on a computer, an employer should be able to tell by a decrease in
work performance. At a minimum, the employer with a reasonable sus-
picion of excessive employee computer use could appropriately launch
an investigation, including monitoring of personal usage. As reasoned
by one arbitrator, occasional performance of personal tasks does not nec-
essarily impact an employee's job performance. 292 The grievant, a law
enforcement officer, had met on more than one occasion with his girl-
friend, had his picture taken with acquaintances, permitted acquaintances
to sit in his cruiser, and made "a bogus traffic stop" of his soon-to-be
girlfriend.293 The arbitrator concluded that personal actions during
work-time did not constitute neglect or inattentiveness to duty when
there was no "affirmative evidence of factual instances of neglect or inat-
tention to duty. '294 He so reasoned even in the law enforcement context
where the arbitrator believed personnel are held to a higher standard in
"the performance of their duties than employees in the private sector. 295
Moreover, a rule that prohibits all personal use opens the door to simply
utilizing an employee's personal use discriminatorily to "get rid" of an
employee for other reasons.
Likewise, to assert that concerns about work-time use justify an out-
right ban on personal use is overreaching. Providing for limited personal
use should not overburden the computer system. If the system shows an
unacceptable overall level of use, then employees can be directed to min-
imize use in order to maintain a working system.296
employees connected and available via the Internet at all times" including sometimes through
portable computers and cell phones).
290 See, e.g., Georgia Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 939 (noting that grievant
spent much time "in a relatively private location" waiting for assignments and employees
frequently spent "a lot of time" on the computer when there was no work).
291 See Franklin County Sheriffs Office, 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 654 (2007) (Bell,
Arb.).
292 See id.
293 See id. at 660.
294 Id. at 662.
295 Id. at 661.
296 Technology is available that would permit an employer to block the downloading of
MP3's, streaming video, or other large files if the bandwith of the system is insufficient to
support such usage. Alternatively, an employer could monitor for downloading of such mate-
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Thus, the default rule should be that employees are not prohibited
from using computers for personal reasons. 297 If the employer can show
that the nature of the work requires a workplace where "work is for
work," and that employees work every minute on the clock and that no
one uses company computers for personal reasons, then the employer
might reasonably institute such a rule. If the employer can show some
other reason that justifies such circumstances, such as an extremely lim-
ited computer capacity, then that too could be considered. But the bur-
den should be on the employer to demonstrate a business necessity for a
rule banning personal use because it is incongruent with the modem
workplace to assert such a rule simply on the basis of property rights.
298
b. Right to Privacy When Using Computer for Personal
Reasons
One arbitrator has implied that employees do have a right to privacy
in their computer usage. In the case, the arbitrator overturned the termi-
nation of an employee who had accessed computer files of another em-
ployee.299 The arbitrator reasoned that "management has, by contract
(seniority clauses, etc.), given the employees rights to their jobs under
decent working conditions."1300 The arbitrator found that the grievant's
supervisor had created indecent working conditions, causing union mem-
bership in his department to increase from three members, which was
about twenty-five percent, to thirteen, which was one hundred percent.
One of the indecent working conditions cited was the monitoring of the
employees' computer usage. One employee testified, "We were scruti-
nized completely .... Our group was being held to a higher standard
than anybody else as far as computer usage ... [O]ur group was being
investigated .... We referred to it as the Gestapo.
301
rial consistent with the protections for employee privacy discussed in this section if the system
bandwith is insufficient to support such usage.
297 Indeed, some companies have policies permitting personal use. See, e.g., Tesoro Ref.
& Mktg. Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1299, 1301 (2005) (Suntrup, Arb.) (Communications
policy permits "[l]imited, occasional or incidental personal, non-business use.").
298 Employers may wish to prohibit employees from using personal e-mail accounts while
at work. For example, one policy, states, "Employees should only set up personal Internet
access through their home computer for non-work related Internet activities. These accounts
should not be accessed using Company equipment." Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
26, 29 (2003) (Daly, Arb.). The rationale behind such a prohibition is unclear. Perhaps the
employer does not want the employee engaged in personal work on the company computer.
That unrealistic goal is discussed above. To the extent use of a personal account is justified by
some type of business necessity, the proposals for safeguards discussed below would appropri-
ately apply to monitoring to ensure employees are not using personal e-mail accounts.
299 See Boeing-Irving Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 699, 704 (1999) (Bankston, Arb.)
(quoting ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 803 (5th ed. 1997)).
300 Id.
301 Id. at 702.
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But other arbitrators have assumed that e-mails are not private un-
less employer policy explicitly affords such protection. 30 2 For example,
one decision involved an employee who opened his supervisor's e-mails
while seated at his supervisor's computer. 30 3 The arbitrator assumed that
the supervisor had no right to privacy in his e-mail.30 4
Not only do many employees use company computers for personal
use, but they often believe that their communications will remain private
when they do S0.305 They may reason that everyone is using the com-
puter for personal reasons and no one has ever had their e-mail moni-
tored or been punished for so doing.306 Additionally, they may believe
302 See, e.g., Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 897, 900 (2002) (Levy, Arb.);
PPG Indus., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 840 (indicating that arbitrator might find a privacy
right if management had told the grievant the e-mail was private). Even one union agreed that
certain uses of company e-mail system, such as by the union for representational purposes, are
not private. See, e.g., Sycamore Bd. of Educ., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1589, 1589 (find-
ing an e-mail sent by an employee collecting information for a grievance was clearly not
private where CBA provided "The Association and/or its members may use e-mail with no
prior approval rights, but no expectation of privacy or security.").
303 See Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 900.
304 See id. This arbitrator fairly nearly adopted the dualistic framework proposed by
Selmi because he also concluded that an affair with a co-worker was permissible, in part
because it occurred during non-working time. But see Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 116
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1049, 1050 (2001) (Cohen, Arb.) (reasoning that a supervisor has a
right to privacy in his office, desk, letter files, and computer files).
305 See Jonathan D. Glater, A Company Computer and Questions About E-Mail Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2008, at C1 ("People disclose all manner of personal information in e-
mail messages, in the expectation-perhaps unfounded-that what they type will remain con-
fidential. Companies often adopt policies explicitly stating that everything an employee does
on a computer provided by the employer is subject to monitoring. But even so, and especially
in the absence of such a policy, employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy
...."); Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 30, at 830 (noting "widespread misconception" that e-
mail is as private as postal mail). One case raises an interesting question of whether an em-
ployee can install a password on his computer which prohibits management from using the
computer. See Saint Gobain Norpro, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 960 (2001) (Fullmer, Arb.).
The arbitrator concluded that the company owned the computers and had a management right
to forbid installation of passwords. See id. at 967. Indeed, while protection for employees'
privacy in personal use of their employer's computer is appropriate, allowing an employee to
prohibit the employer any access to the computer is not. At a minimum, the employer may
need such access to maintain its equipment. Further there are instances where the employer
needs to access the computer to perform work. Additionally, even if only the assigned em-
ployee performs work on the computer, the employer may have a need to access work-product,
as opposed to personal e-mail or folders, on the computer. Adequate privacy protections need
not interfere with these legitimate employer interests. Cf. Arkansas Educ. Ass'n., 118 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1540 (2003) (Moore, Arb.) (interest arbitration rejecting proposal that em-
ployees perform routine maintenance on assigned computers and supporting proposal where
computers are sent to appropriate location for employer to make changes).
306 See, e.g., Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 271, 275 (2001) (Goodstein,
Arb.) (finding that past practice of permitting use of e-mail for non-business related activity
"completely negated" its written policy to the contrary); cf. Alliedsignal Engines, 106 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 614, 624 (1996) (Rivera, Arb.) (noting that where grievant in non-union
setting sent his newsletter via e-mail "the past practice of the Employer that allowed, over a
2009]
662 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:609
that while the employer might for some reason decide to view a personal
e-mail, they would not be disciplined for its content. 30 7
Statements that an employee has "no expectation of privacy regard-
ing personal information they have stored on or sent from Company
equipment" 30 8 or that management "reserves the right" to monitor com-
puter usage are unlikely to dispel employees' beliefs in the privacy of
their electronic communications when no conduct of the employer evi-
dences otherwise. Instead, more effective protections for the privacy of
employees' personal computer use are necessary.
c. Prohibited Types of Personal Use of Company
Computers
While there is generally no justification for monitoring to ensure
that employees are not utilizing computers for personal use, monitoring
to ensure that employees are not utilizing computers for certain prohib-
ited uses can be appropriate. An employer has a legitimate business in-
terest in prohibiting certain computer uses that are likely to negatively
impact the business or workplace. When such monitoring takes place, it
should, however, be subject to a framework of safeguards that provides
suitable protection for an employee's right to privacy. 309
The arbitration decisions disclose several types of computer use that
are likely to negatively impact the business or workplace. Employers
might reasonably prohibit use that is likely illegal, 310 such as download-
ing images of child pornography. 3 11 An employer should not have to
tolerate use of its equipment for illegal purposes or risk responsibility for
its employees' illegal conduct.312 Employers might also reasonably pro-
hibit computer use that would be unlawful, such as a defamatory
communication. 313
ten year period, the publication of the offending newsletter lulled the Grievant into a false
sense of security.").
307 The belief of an employee who made a racist remark in the privacy of the backroom,
or of a woman who sent a racist e-mail, she believed to be anonymous, to a chat room are
examples of similar beliefs. See MT Detroit, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1777 (2003) (Allen,
Arb.); King Soopers, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 501 (2004) (Sass, Arb.).
308 Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 26, 28 (2003) (Daly, Arb.).
309 See discussion infra Parts C.3.e- f.
3 10 See, e.g., Sycamore Bd. of Educ., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1588, 1599 (BNA) (2007) (dis-
cussing how although the employer may not generally interfere with the union's right, once
employer grants the right to use the computer system, employer may restrict the use of the e-
mail for unlawful purposes).
3t See, e.g., Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 34.
312 But see Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1167 (N.J. Super. 2005) (holding that
employer may be held liable for child pornography if it has reason to know the employee is
using the computer to disseminate pornography).
313 See, e.g., Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1299, 1301 (2005)
(noting policy that forbids electronic communications that are defamatory).
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Employers might reasonably prohibit images of a racial or sexual
nature that might offend co-workers. While there is far-ranging debate
on the appropriateness of restricting people's right to free speech in order
to promote the equality of women and racial minorities, it is well-estab-
lished within the workplace that certain speech and conduct must be pro-
hibited or else racial or sexual harassment might result. Prohibiting this
category of racial or sexual images protects employers from liability.314
It is also fairly commonplace to prohibit statements and images that
are racially or sexually offensive but do not rise to a legally-forbidden
level.31 5 And for purposes of a workable privacy policy, it is reasonable
to permit employers to prohibit the entire category of images when ap-
propriate safeguards to protect employees' privacy are in place. Racist
statements and sexual pictures that are, inadvertently or purposefully, ex-
posed to co-workers do have the potential to offend co-workers. 316 Such
images can also contribute to a workplace that is inhospitable to women
or minorities, despite not rising to the level of legally "hostile. ' 31 7 Addi-
tionally, society generally disapproves of these types of materials at
work.318 Moreover, it is likely easier and less expensive to monitor for
314 See, e.g., Sycamore Bd. of Educ., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1588 (discussing how
although the employer may not generally interfere with the union's right, once the employer
grants the right to use the computer system, the employer may prohibit the use of the e-mail to
racially or sexually harass other employees).
315 See Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1301 (stating that employ-
ees must not "store or retrieve any communication of a discriminatory or offensive nature
which are derogatory to any individual or group or which are obscene or defamatory. The
viewing of Internet sites containing sexual material is strictly prohibited."); A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1371, 1373 (2004) (Nathan, Arb.) (stating in its policy that e-
mail and the Internet "may not be used to send or receive pornography or other inappropriate
messages and/or materials."); MT Detroit, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1777, 1782 (2003)
(Allen, Arb.) (upholding termination of employee who sent message with offensive racial lan-
guage to a "chat room"); County of Sacramento, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 699, 699 (2003)
(Riker, Arb.) (prohibiting "sexually-related banter, jokes, propositions, and/or activities"); U.S.
Dept. of Agric., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1212, 1216 (2003) (Cook, Arb.) (upholding five
day suspension for viewing sexually explicit web pages on employer's computer while off-
duty); State of Minn., 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1569, 1573 (2002) (Neigh, Arb.) (upholding
termination because viewed more violent and disturbing pornography than other employees);
S. Cal. Edison, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1066, 1072 (2002) (Prayzich, Arb.) (upholding
suspension for e-mailing calendar that was offensive and where certain pictures violated the
employer's equal opportunity policies, which were more prohibitive than required by law);
PPG Indus., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833, 842 (1999) (Dichter, Arb) (concluding that sexual
jokes sent to employees who did not take offense violated employer's sexual harassment
policy).
316 See, e.g., King Soopers, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 501, 505 (2004) (Sass, Arb.)
(the co-worker who reported the statement was offended by it even though the offending party
did not mean to offend).
317 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct 367, 370 (1993).
318 See PPG Indus., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 844 ("[A]II employers in today's day
and age must insure that the work environment is free from the type of material that was in
grievant's mailbox. It cannot close its eyes to what grievant did. Failure to act is unfair to
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all types of sexual and racial images rather than having to develop a
monitoring system that aims to monitor only those that amount to unlaw-
ful sexual or racial harassment.
On the other hand, there are reasons that a privacy policy may limit
prohibited computer usage to unlawful harassment. 319 To the extent e-
mails or Internet views are completely private, they do not have the po-
tential to offend anyone. 320 And it is certainly debatable whether
prohibitions of this type lead to inhospitable workplaces for employ-
ees,32 1 or unnecessarily deprive them of rights of speech and privacy.
Employer expense should not easily outweigh privacy. Nor does general
social disapproval translate to the reality of many workplaces where the
viewing of pornography is fairly common. 322 Furthermore, such private
viewing is generally no more disruptive of the workplace than any other
type of private conduct. If, for instance, an employee is permitted to read
during work, it would appear unnecessary and overbearing to prohibit
reading lewd books that contain no pictures. 323 One arbitrator con-
cluded, for instance, that receipt by a computer systems manager of inap-
propriate and sexually explicit e-mails did not provide a basis for
discipline. 324 The arbitrator found that "conclusionary remarks about
other employees and subjects the Employer to potential liability. An employer that fails to
strongly address conduct like the grievant's is buying itself a lawsuit.").
319 Finkin, for instance, discounts an employer's need to monitor for racially or sexually
offensive material. "[T]he speech involved must be so pervasive as to alter working condi-
tions: A single display of a pornographic picture on a video terminal or the transmission of an
ethnic or sexual joke to a limited number of people would not be actionable. And, as the
Supreme Court of New Jersey was at pains to emphasize, there is no duty to monitor to assure
that offensive remarks are not transmitted." FINKIN, supra note 43, at 281.
320 See Georgia Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. 936, 946-47 (2006) (Nolan, Arb.) (hold-
ing that private viewing of pornography when no one else was present was not threatening or
harassing and did not violate laws or create liability, but viewing such pornography did violate
reasonable work rules).
321 See CYNTHIA EsTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN
A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 158 (Oxford 2003) ("It is no answer to say-as defenders of harass-
ment law sometimes do-that 'the workplace is for work.' As we have seen, the workplace is
for much more than work, both in the lives of individual workers and in the society as a whole.
The law should not adopt as its motto a proposition that would so impoverish social life.").
322 See, e.g., A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1371, 1376 (2004) (Na-
than, Arb.) (union argued that "commonplace nature" of sexually explicit materials means that
viewing pornography is not a "capital workplace offense").
323 Another interesting hypothetical to consider is whether an employer would prohibit an
employee from storing pornographic magazines in his locker.
324 Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 897, 899-900 (2002) (Levy, Arb.). An-
other case indicates that personal use, including receipt of "earthy, candid, and disgusting" e-
mails, does not constitute inappropriate use of the computer system. See City of Fort Worth,
123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1125, 1129-30 (2007) (Moore, Arb.). The applicable electronic
communications use policy forbid certain specified uses, such as for harassment, and uses
creating "the appearance of inappropriate use." See id. The arbitrator reasoned that "[w]hat
may be one individual's art may be another's pornography." Id. He reasoned that the grievant
did not generate the pictures, implying company time and resources were not used, and she did
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breach of trust, abuse of position, and harm to public service are not
established and are not substitutes for required just cause. 325
An employer might reasonably prohibit the use for personal reasons
of proprietary company information located on databases. For example,
in one case, an arbitrator decided a one-day suspension would be appro-
priate when a deputy sheriff ran acquaintances' names through a law
enforcement database containing motor vehicle and warrant informa-
tion.3 2 6 In another, an arbitrator imposed a suspension when an em-
ployee checked a social services database to verify that a complaint of
child neglect had been filed against her.327
An employer might also reasonably prohibit solicitation. 328 While
prohibiting certain solicitation is barred by federal law,329 generally
prohibiting employees from asking co-workers for money or support for
non-work activities is justified. Co-workers might otherwise feel pres-
sure to support a cause they do not believe in or to give money they
would prefer to spend elsewhere. Additionally, employers might pro-
hibit messages disrespectful of management.330
Any penalty imposed for violation of these latter two prohibitions
should be mitigated by the private nature of any such message whether or
not the monitoring is with notice to employees. 33 1 Employees are bound
to privately make statements critical of management or their employers
and bound to ask friendly co-workers to buy Girl Scout cookies. And the
not disseminate them, implying no co-workers were affected by them. See id. Thus, the griev-
ant was reinstated and granted backpay. See id.
325 Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 897, 899-900 (2002) (Levy, Arb.).
326 See Franklin County Sheriff's Office, 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 654, 660-63 (2007)
(Bell, Arb.).
327 See Montana Child and Family Servs., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 656, 662 (2006)
(Reeves, Arb.).
328 See Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 26, 29 (2003) (Daly, Arb.).
329 See Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (Dec. 16, 2007), 2007 NLRB Lexis 499, 12
(holding that employer may not prohibit only union-related e-mail messages of a certain type
while permitting other messages of the same type, such as personal messages).
330 See Marine Corps Air Ground Command Ctr., 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 161, 162
(1998) (Gentile, Arb.) (concluding that disrespectful e-mail, stating grievant had "continued to
tolerate the abuse and micro management of the Comptroller's shop," provided grounds for
termination in conjunction with the more serious conduct of verbal threats against
management).
331 The NLRA may prohibit employers from conducting surveillance for the purpose of
finding certain messages that are concerted activity regarding terms and conditions of work.
Finkin, supra 21, at 499. But see Register-Guard, 351 NLRB No. 70 (Dec. 16, 2007) (stating
employers can prohibit use of computers for "non-job-related solicitations," including union
solicitations, unless the employer discriminates by banning only some "organizational
notices").
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harm from such statements or requests is not as significant as that from
the other types of prohibited computer usage.332
This list is not intended to be exhaustive on the topic of communica-
tions that an employer has a legitimate business interest in prohibiting
because they are likely to negatively impact the workplace. For instance,
using computers to copy trade secrets would fall within this category.
Rather, this list provides a starting point, based on the arbitration deci-
sions, for legislators, courts, and others to use in framing appropriate
protections for employees' right to privacy.
d. Limiting Personal Use of Computer
Arbitration decisions suggest that employers have a legitimate busi-
ness interest in ensuring that excessive personal computer use does not
result in interference with successful job performance. 333 For instance,
in one case, a campus police officer self-reported his work time, yet com-
puter records revealed that he had been using another employee's com-
puter during the time he was self-reporting the completion of checking
the premise of one facility. 334 The amount of time spent on the computer
indicated that it would have been impossible for him to have completed
the necessary premise check, thus leaving the premise unchecked and
unsecured. 335 The arbitrator upheld his termination. 336
In fact, in one decision, there was no evidence that the quality of the
grievant's work suffered, but an arbitrator upheld a twenty-four-hour sus-
pension for "occasional to frequent" use of his work computer for "his
personal metal fabrication business. ' 337 This misuse was proved not
through records of monitoring, but through testimony of co-workers who
observed the grievant using the computer for personal reasons. 338
Additionally, several decisions suggest that personal use of com-
puters can be limited to break time. For instance, in one case, the arbitra-
tor found that it was appropriate to admonish a union representative for
332 See, e.g., Sycamore Bd. of Educ., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1588, 1590-91 (2007)
(discussing an e-mail which ridiculed a rule governing the number of posters a teacher could
hang on the classroom walls).
333 See, e.g., Univ. of Mich., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1401 (when an employee has a
history of abusing phone call privilege to make numerous personal phone calls during and after
working hours, to the extent it negatively impacted his work, the employer could direct the
employee not to make or receive personal calls while on break after discussing and attempting
to resolve the issue with the union).
334 See Univ. of Chi., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 88, 95, 96 (2004) (Briggs, Arb.).
335 See id.
336 See id.
337 City of El Paso, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 691, 695 (2006) (Greer, Arb.).
338 See id. at 694; see also Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1043, 1048 (2001) (upholding termination for, among other reasons, using computer for non-
work reasons for six to eight hours a week during work-time).
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using the e-mail system during his work time to notify other members of
a union meeting without first seeking the permission of management. 339
The arbitrator reasoned that the representative could not have been on his
fifteen minute break at the time of day that he sent the e-mail. 340
Another arbitrator also upheld limiting Internet use to break time.
The grievant's supervisor saw him access the Internet for what appeared
to be non-business reasons several times.341 She also saw him call over
other employees to view his computer screen and announce breaking
news. 342 The supervisor requested an audit of the grievant's computer
usage.34 3 The audit disclosed that the grievant was repeatedly using the
computer during work time for non-business related purposes, such as
accessing websites of Ticketmaster, weather.com, the St. Petersburg
Times, and USA jobs. 34 4 The arbitrator found that personal use was rea-
sonably limited to break times because intermittent viewing of websites
would be "disruptive and inefficient as to productivity. ' 345 As a result, it
would likely adversely affect the employee's work performance, as the
arbitrator found it had in the case. 346
Generally, however, employees should not be limited to using the
computer for personal reasons during break time. Sending a brief e-mail,
such as the one at issue in the case regarding the union representative, is
no more disruptive than saying hello to a passing co-worker or stopping
to look around and give one's eyes a rest. If the level of personal use is
significant, this should manifest itself in a. reduction in the quantity or
quality of an employee's work, as was apparent to the supervisor in the
latter case.
Moreover, as some of these cases suggest, before conducting sur-
reptitious monitoring of an employee for the purpose of discovering ex-
cessive computer use, the employer should have a reasonable suspicion
that the employee is using the computer in a way that is likely to detri-
mentally impact his work. If there is no reasonable suspicion, there are
no grounds to surreptitiously monitor the e-mail. And if there is already
adequate proof of excessive use (such as in the case where co-workers
testified about the metal fabrication business), no further monitoring is
necessary. Additional safeguards for surreptitious monitoring of com-
339 See Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1543, 1546 (2003)
(Oberdank, Arb.). It is unclear by what method the e-mail was discovered by management, so
whether it was open or hidden surveillance cannot be ascertained from the decision.
340 See id.






346 See id. at 111-12.
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puter use are discussed below in Sub-Section VII.C.3.f. But in order to
appropriately protect employees' privacy, the safeguard of requiring em-
ployers to use other means of verifying wrong-doing, such as assessing
the quality or quantity of the employee's work, should be instituted when
the purpose of the monitoring is to prove that use of work time for per-
sonal reasons is negatively impacting an employee's job performance.
e. Open Monitoring of Computer Use
One important safeguard suggested by the decisions is notice that
employees are being monitored and notice of which types of content or
actions are prohibited and being searched for.347 Notice alone, however,
is insufficient to protect employees' right to privacy in their personal
computer use. Rather, the monitoring system must be used consistently
and violations consistently disciplined so that a culture of engaging in
prohibited conduct that is contrary to the written policy does not de-
velop. 34 8 Several cases illustrate this safeguard.
For instance, one arbitrator found that because employees, including
supervisors, routinely used the computer system to send e-mail for non-
business related activities, including sending sexually-related jokes, a
company's policy forbidding such use was "completely negated." 349 The
arbitrator reasoned that failing to monitor for prohibited use and instead
relying only on complaints of inappropriate use meant that employees
"had a right to believe that what they are doing has been condoned by the
Company." 350 The arbitrator suggested that "by spot checking the e-mail
messages sent over the Company computers, from time to time, the
Company could determine whether anyone was violating the Company's
e-mail Policy."' 35 1 The grievant's termination was reduced to a three-day
suspension.352
Another arbitrator similarly decided that when supervisors "on a
regular basis knowingly tolerated, condoned and joined" in sending e-
mails which were inappropriate per a written policy, there was no just
347 See S. Cal. Edison, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1066, 1071 (2002) (upholding suspen-
sion for circulating offensive calendar via e-mail where employee was on notice of detailed
and comprehensive equal opportunity policy that prohibited derogatory pictures and suggestive
calendar displays).
348 See Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 26, 30-34 (2003) (Daly, Arb.) The
complaint that "pornography was one thing, but child pornography was something else," sug-
gests that employees might commonly be viewing pornography without being "caught." Em-
ployees are not likely to come forward to testify to this because they are reluctant to identify
themselves or their co-workers knowing that termination will result. See Chevron Prods. Co.,
116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 271 (2001) (Goodstein, Arb.).
349 Id. at 272.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 279.
352 See id. at 281.
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cause for the grievant's termination. 353 The arbitrator reasoned that lax
enforcement lulls employees into "a false sense of security." 354 Another
case suggests that while some level of discipline might be appropriate
when enforcement of a computer usage policy is not consistent, the re-
sulting invasion of privacy must mitigate any discipline imposed.355 The
employer permitted an internal, non-Internet, communication system de-
signed for use in emergencies to be utilized to notify employees when
"muffins were being delivered to the office. '356 The arbitrator held that
the non-emergency use mitigated the discipline of an employee who used
the system to send sexually-explicit messages to a co-worker. 357
In another decision, arbitrators recognized that the private nature of
viewing prohibited content must mitigate the level of discipline imposed
for the infraction. 358 The arbitrators concluded this was so despite the
following facts: the employees knew that the company would monitor
electronic communications, the grievant knew that viewing the content
was prohibited, the grievant knew that he could be disciplined and possi-
bly discharged, and the company had a consistent enforcement policy of
monitoring for attempts to access inappropriate sites and instituting an
investigation of all computer usage for all employees who attempted to
access twenty or more inappropriate sites in one month. 359
The union did not challenge the monitoring system on privacy
grounds. The union did, however, contend that the company had not
warned employees that it "was keeping a record of the number" of inap-
propriately accessed pages or that attempting to access twenty "might
lead to investigation or discipline." 360 The arbitrators did not directly
address the contention but did conclude that the company had warned
employees that it would monitor electronic communications. 361
The result of the case is a reasonable starting point for developing
workable protections for employee privacy from monitoring of computer
usage. It permits a type of generalized monitoring where certain em-
ployee conduct triggers scrutiny of the actual content of webpages
353 Snohomish County, 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1, 7 (2000) (Levak, Arb.).
354 Id. (quoting DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION 81 (Norman Brand ed.,
1998)).
355 See County of Sacramento, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 699, 701 (2003) (Riker, Arb.).
356 Id.
357 See id.
358 See Georgia Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 936, 947 (2006) (Nolan, Arb.).
359 See id. The company used an outside vendor who provided a list of banned sites
based on employees' internet usage. The company's monitoring system blocked access to
these sites. See id.
360 Id. at 944.
361 See id. at 947 (the information on the policies provided is not sufficient to assess this
conclusion; it only states that the company reserves the right to monitor, which is different
than stating that the company will or is monitoring).
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viewed and downloaded. Employees are notified that the monitoring is
taking place and notified of which conduct constitutes infractions, and
the monitoring is consistent (as presumably is imposition of discipline
for infractions). And while employees are not notified of the specifics of
the monitoring program, the private nature of the conduct serves to miti-
gate any discipline that can be imposed because the specific type of mon-
itoring is not clear.362 To ensure protection of the employees' privacy,
the additional safeguards of having a confidential reviewer or limiting
collection to that connected to the purpose of monitoring should also be
implemented. For instance, in this situation, a confidential person would
pull all websites that appeared related to pornography and would not re-
port other personal matters, for instance paying an electric bill or check-
ing library hours, to management. 363
An alternative would be a policy where the employees were notified
of the monitoring, notified of the particulars of the monitoring (such as
the number of prohibited sites accessed and number of attempts that lead
to greater scrutiny), and notified of the infractions (but not necessarily
the level of resulting discipline). If such a policy was consistently en-
forced, so that employees were not lulled into a false sense of privacy,
then there would be no mitigation of discipline due to the private nature
of the conduct. The employees would be well-aware that they were be-
ing monitored and would be disciplined for prohibited conduct. Addi-
tional provisions would include confidential review so as to ensure that
personal non-prohibited conduct was not reported to management or re-
stricted monitoring to gather only the type of communication or informa-
tion prohibited.
f. Surreptitious Monitoring of Computer Use
Several cases suggest that surreptitious review of computer usage is
appropriate when there is a reasonable suspicion that a violation of com-
362 Some arbitrators have, however, considered the private nature of the conduct to be an
aggravating, rather than a mitigating factor. In a case where an employee sent pornographic e-
mails to co-workers and others "at night or other times when only one supervisor was in the
plant," the arbitrator considered this to support upholding termination. See A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1371, 1375 (2004) (Nathan, Arb.).
363 The confidential reviewer could disclose other violations that were incidentally dis-
covered to management. In one case an employer promised an employee confidentiality when
interviewing her as part of a sexual-harassment investigation. The employee disclosed that she
had used an internal computer system to send sexually explicit messages to a co-worker. The
interviewer stated that the information she provided would not "be reported to her supervisor
or co-workers, unless there was a need to know." The arbitrator reasoned that the one-day-
suspension of the employee should be reduced to a written reprimand, in part because it was
based on her confidential disclosures. See County of Sacramento, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
699, 702 (2003) (Riker, Arb.).
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pany policy has taken place. 364 In one case, the policy permitted "lim-
ited, occasional or incidental personal, non-business use. 365  It
prohibited storing or retrieving discriminatory, offensive, derogatory, ob-
scene, sexual, or defamatory communications. 366 The policy also indi-
cated that the company did not intend to strictly monitor the computer
system, but that it reserved the right to do so. 367 In particular, the com-
pany might do so to ensure an employee's usage complied with the law
and company policies or when the company had a business need to moni-
tor.368 The policy warned that abuse of the policy would subject an em-
ployee "to disciplinary action without further warning, up to and
including discharge .... ,,369 In the particular case, a co-worker had e-
mailed members of the bargaining unit, including the grievant, warning
them not to access pornographic sites because he had been disciplined
for doing so. 370 The grievant was, thus, arguably provided notice that
infractions were being disciplined. Human resources instigated an inves-
tigation of the grievant's computer usage when he posted a hate group's
poster, with a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) address indicated, on
the company bulletin board. Human resources discovered that the griev-
ant had accessed hate sites and pornographic sites "innumerable
times. '371 The arbitrator upheld his termination based on the misuse of
the computer system and additional misconduct.
364 See, e.g., Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 106, 108 (2006) (Hoff-
man, Arb.) (supervisor observed grievant repeatedly using computer for non-work related
matters and calling other employees over to view his computer or announcing news to them
and so requested a review of his internet usage); Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 300 (2005) (Petersen, Arb.) (e-mails evidencing a slowdown were discovered when
someone alleged harassment and defamation; the arbitrator reduced the discharge to a written
reprimand because that was the penalty for a slowdown under the employer's progressive
discipline policy); Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1299, 1303 (2005)
(investigation where employee posted hate group poster with listed URL); A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1371 (2004) (Nathan, Arb.); MT Detroit, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1777 (2003) (Allen, Arb.) ("chat room" operator informed company that an employee
had posted a message containing offensive racial language); State of Minn., 117 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1569 (2002) (Neigh, Arb.) (extensive investigation of chain of pornographic e-
mails and related computer use based on complaint from one employee that she viewed a
naked woman on co-worker's computer screen); cf Union-Scioto Local Bd. of Educ., 119
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1071,1075-76 (2004) (concluding that grievant had diminished expec-
tation of privacy when engaging in conversation on employer property during work-time but
that, nevertheless, discipline was inappropriate where employer surreptitiously and selectively
videotaped conversation without any evidence of misconduct by grievant).
365 Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1299, 1301 (2005) (Suntrup,
Arb.).
366 See id.
367 See id. at 1302.
368 See id.
369 Id. at 1302.
370 See id. at 1306.
371 Id.
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Another arbitrator explicitly found no privacy violation of an em-
ployee's rights in a case involving similar facts. 372 The arbitrator con-
cluded that employees have no expectation of privacy, even when using
an individualized e-mail password, because an employer has a right to
see "material that would be confidential to others" and the company pro-
vides the computer access to the employee. 373 The arbitrator also con-
cluded, however, that the grievant could not be disciplined for bypassing
a firewall because the employer provided insufficient notice that a pur-
pose of the firewall was to exclude pornographic material. 374
In addition to requiring a reasonable suspicion of an infraction,
these cases suggest several other potential safeguards. They suggest that
notice of the type of conduct that will constitute an infraction and the
potential level of resulting discipline for an infraction is important. They
also suggest that notice that monitoring will take place when the em-
ployer has a reasonable suspicion of an infraction can be an appropriate
safeguard. Finally, they suggest that notice of the particulars of the mon-
itoring system also serves as an important safeguard.
Indeed, while surreptitious review of e-mail may be appropriate
when an employer has a reasonable suspicion of an infraction, additional
safeguards should be mandated to protect an employee's privacy. Em-
ployees should be notified of potential infractions and the discipline that
might result from engaging in any infraction. As discussed with open
monitoring, the collection should be performed by a confidential em-
ployee or limited to review of usage that appears to relate to the infrac-
tion suspected because the review is likely to disclose personal
information and an employee's private thoughts.375
Additional safeguards might work in combination. For example,
the employer should first try other avenues of confirming the supposed
infraction, such as via interviews of co-workers. The employer should
compensate the employee for the invasion of privacy, because the em-
ployee was not on notice that her thoughts might be reviewed. Addition-
372 See PPG Indus. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833, 840 (1999) (Dichter, Arb.). The
employer investigated the employee's e-mail based on a co-worker's complaint. See id. The
investigation of the chain of e-mails led the employer to change the grievant's password in
order to access his e-mal. See id. Therein, the employer discovered hard-core material which
had been e-mailed from grievant's home computer, and to other employees and an employee
of an independent contractor. See id. The arbitrator did not uphold the discharge, however,
instead providing reinstatement (after nine months leave) with no back-pay. See id. The pri-
vacy challenge was purportedly launched under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
See id.
373 Id.
374 See id. at 842.
375 The confidential employee could also report violations that were not the focus of the
investigation, so under that type of review, the initial case where discipline was imposed for a
slow-down based on review for defamation would be possible.
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ally, the private nature of the conduct should mitigate any discipline
imposed. 376
Alternatively, the employer could notify employees that it will mon-
itor e-mails and computer usage when it has a reasonable suspicion of an
infraction and clearly notify the employees of the particulars of the moni-
toring system that will be used, as well as resulting infractions. 377 Notice
that it "reserves the right" to monitor, or may monitor, should not suffice.
An employer should enforce the policy in order to notify employees that
such monitoring is taking place. The notice would indicate that the inva-
sion of privacy was not as severe, suggesting that either mitigation of the
discipline or compensation for the injury would suffice as an appropriate
safeguard.
Another case erroneously suggests that reasonable suspicion, with-
out other safeguards except notice that the conduct is prohibited, pro-
vides an adequate basis to monitor employees, at least in circumstances
involving "hard core" pornography. 378 In the case, a company was in-
vestigating an employee and discovered that employees were e-mailing
pornography. 379 The grievant was terminated for sending "hard core"
images to other employees and people outside the plant, and sometimes
introducing them to the company system by e-mailing them from his
home computer. The arbitrator upheld the discharge, reasoning that the
conduct was "so discredited in the workplace" that the grievant need not
have been told it could lead to discharge. 380
The arbitrator in this case so ruled despite widespread pornographic
communication through the system and the lack of warning that such
communication could result in discharge. 381 While the number of em-
ployees in the plant was not specified, the employer had already "uncov-
ered" twenty-five employees sending pornographic messages in a plant
with one hundred and forty computers. 382 The arbitrator conceded that
there was "some merit" to the argument that "the conduct had been going
376 An exception could be provided that the private nature of the conduct would not miti-
gate discipline when the monitoring was based on a reasonable suspicion of excessive personal
use.
377 All the safeguards discussed in the paragraph before the preceding one would equally
apply.
378 See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1371, 1374 (2004) (Nathan,
Arb.).
379 See id.
380 See id. at 1375; cf. PPG Indus., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833, 843 (1999) (Dichter,
Arb.) ("There can be no doubt that even apart from any Rule violations what grievant did
exceeds the bounds of propriety and warrants discipline."); State of Minn. Dept. of Admin.,
117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1569 (2002) (Neigh, Arb.) (upholding termination because the
grievant viewed more violent and disturbing pornography than other employees).
381 See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1371, 1374 (2004) (Nathan,
Arb.).
382 See id. at 1374.
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on for so long that the employees were impliedly led to believe that it
would not give rise to grave discipline. 383
Nevertheless, the arbitrator believed the company had been dam-
aged in four respects: misuse of equipment, wasting "time for which [the
grievant] was being paid," disrupting "the efficiency of other employ-
ees," and exposing the company "to risks of liability and disruption of its
overall system. '384 He concluded, "The grievant was potentially expos-
ing the Company's email system to the purveyors of pornography who
might have gained access to the larger system and infected the network
with their filth. '385
Misuse of equipment does not, however, standing on its own, dam-
age an employer. For instance, if a person needs to stop a leak in the
ceiling from dripping on the floor and the only receptacle around is a
waste paper basket, then the basket's misuse as a rain catcher would not
damage the company. Likewise, if an employee needs to send a personal
letter and takes an envelope, but replaces it with one from home the next
day, the envelope has been misused but the harm is minimal, if any.
Wasting time or disrupting co-workers' efficiency does harm the
employer but is generally evidenced in a lack of quantity or quality of
production. 38 6 Limited computer use does not waste any more time than
many other personal activities prevalent in the workplace, such as chat-
ting with co-workers or listening to the radio. Even if the conduct did
waste a significant amount of time, the violation of privacy would out-
weigh that waste if the monitoring was not conducted with appropriate
safeguards.
It is unclear what is meant technologically by "disruption of the
system" and "purveyors of pornography who might have gained access
to the larger system and infected the network with their filth." It might
indicate spammers, spy-ware, or even viruses. One might surmise, how-
ever, that spammers are no more likely to invade a system based on e-
mailing employees, a home e-mail address, or friends than they are based
on business related e-mail. 387 And any time one accesses the web for
business or other reasons, one risks infection by virus or spy-ware. Most
systems have protection from all of these potential "invaders," and it is
doubtful that the risk of personal e-mail, even if pornographic in nature,
poses such a risk that discharge is appropriate despite a lack of appropri-
ate safeguards for employees' privacy.
383 Id. at 1376.
384 Id. at 1375.
385 Id. at 1376.
386 See supra Section VII.C.3.d.
387 Downloading from pornographic sites that will sell user information may lead to
spammers.
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This leaves "risk of liability" as the only potentially reasonable
grounds for the discharge. It is unclear what the risk of liability is, ex-
cept perhaps for sexual harassment. Yet while a reasonable suspicion
that an employee is utilizing a computer to forward pornography is an
appropriate grounds for monitoring personal usage of the employee's
computer, it hardly justifies discharge when other safeguards for protec-
tion of employees' privacy are not in place.
A standard for what constitutes reasonable suspicion should be de-
veloped. As mentioned above, one case suggests that when there is a
particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, but no proof beyond the accusa-
tion of a co-worker, a limited exception for surreptitious monitoring of a
limited duration is appropriate in order to verify the accusation. 38 8 This
thesis is supported in the context of monitoring of computer usage as
well.
3 89
g. Discipline for Computer Use
A number of decisions suggest that the degree to which prohibited
information was kept private should be considered, and the level of disci-
pline imposed adjusted accordingly. 390 Many decisions suggest that dis-
ciplining employees because of prohibited behavior that was only private
and exposed to no one else should considerably mitigate any discipline
imposed. 39' Moreover, even when the material has been shared with
others, if the number of recipients was few or if the recipients were
388 See Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 26 (2003) (Daly, Arb.).
389 See City of Fort Worth, Tex., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1125 (2007) (Moore, Arb.) (search
of e-mail conducted when one employee reported grievant was assisting another employee in
theft of saw-blades); S. Cal. Edison, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1066, 1069 (2002) (Prayzich,
Arb.) (implying search of grievant's e-mail was performed when co-worker complained about
receiving offensive calendar).
390 Cf MT Detroit, Inc., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1777 (2003) (Allen, Arb.) (when an
employee sent a message with offensive racial language that she believed to be anonymous but
was actually traceable back to the employer, the employee's belief that the message was anon-
ymous did not mitigate the termination).
391 See, e.g., City of Fort Worth, Tex., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1125 (2007) (Moore, Arb.)
(considering that employee did not disseminate e-mails as important in decision to reinstate
employee with back-pay); Snohomish County Wash. Pub. County Dist. No. 1, 115 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1, 8 (2000) (Levak, Arb.) ("penalty of discharge was far too severe" when em-
ployee sent inappropriate e-mails only to his own home e-mail address); cf Xcel Energy Co.,
123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 603 (discharge for keeping a private joke file in desk that was
"never shared with other employees" is inappropriate; appropriate discipline is suspension);
Wackenhut Corr. Corp., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 63 (2003) (O'Connor, Arb.) (suggesting
that grievant's understandable embarrassment when supervisor shared private phone message
from abortion clinic with a co-worker would mitigate the imposition of discharge for insubor-
dinately yelling at supervisor upon learning of the disclosure).
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friends of the employee, this also should mitigate any imposed
discipline. 392
As discussed above, the suggested proposals adopt this safeguard,
except in some situations where the employee is on notice of the particu-
lars of monitoring. 393 Unlike a situation where an employee is told con-
duct is prohibited but does not have notice that the particular private area
will be monitored, when an employer provides notice to an employee of
the prohibited conduct and of the fact that monitoring through a specified
system is ongoing, the employee knows not to engage in the conduct,
even in private. Thus, the privacy interest of the employee weighs less
when such a policy is in effect.
4. Off-Duty Behavior
As stated by one arbitrator, "As a general rule, once an employee is
off duty and away from the workplace, there is a presumption that the
employee's private life is beyond the employer's control. ' 394 This sec-
tion first discusses the safeguard of limiting employers' ability to disci-
pline for off-duty conduct and then describes different combinations of
rules that would adequately protect employees from employer monitor-
ing of off-duty conduct.
a. Disciplining for Off-Duty Conduct
Many arbitration decisions limit discipline for off-duty conduct.
Such limitations provide a safeguard for employees' right to privacy in
their personal off-duty activities. The arbitral authority regarding this
392 See Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 271, 274, 280, 281 (emphasizing
that grievant sent arguably sexually explicit and offensive e-mails to only three close friends
none of whom would be offended, in reasoning termination should be reduced to suspension);
cf Cingular Wireless, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 438, 441 (2005) (Nolan, Arb.) (The arbitra-
tor reasoned that "[a]n employee's one-time use of an offensive term [when speaking to super-
visor about a customer] hardly rises" to the level justifying termination.); JBM, Inc., 120 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1688, 1699 (2005) (Rosen, Arb.) (termination is not appropriate where griev-
ant swore two times in private conversations with supervisors that did not disrupt the work-
place); King Soopers, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 501, 506 (2004) (Sass, Arb.)
(circumstances surrounding grievant's racist statement including the fact that "[tlhis was an
isolated comment made in the privacy of the back room by one employee to another..." must
be considered).
393 See supra Section VI.C.3.e- f.
394 Dept. of Corr. Servs., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1533, 1536 (1997) (Simmelkjaer,
Arb.). See also ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 193, at 1111 ("It is well established that the
time of an employee outside his regular hours of work and outside the overtime sometimes
incidental thereto belongs to him and may be used for recreation and work, provided the em-
ployee does not engage in practices or occupations that are detrimental or clearly prejudicial to
the business and interests with which his duties in the service of his regular employee are
connected.") (quoting Janitorial Serv., 33 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 902, 907-08 (1959) (Whelan,
Arb.)).
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safeguard serves as a good starting point for devising adequate privacy
protections for employees' off-duty conduct.
A review of the cases suggests that an employer must prove some
significant concrete harm to the employer in order to discipline an em-
ployee for off-duty conduct, because off-duty conduct is subject to a high
level of privacy. 39 5 Some arbitrators use the terminology that discipline
for off-duty conduct requires proof of a "direct nexus" between the mis-
conduct and the employer's "legitimate interests. '396 The decisions rec-
ognize several categories of significant concrete harm to the employer
that generally justify discipline for off-duty conduct. They also recog-
nize several categories that do not suffice to justify discipline.
i) Examples of Significant Concrete Harms
Two relatively recent cases dealing with Internet activity suggest
that one concern magnified by the new technology is that of employees
competing with their employers. In one case, the arbitrator upheld a ter-
mination in part based upon an employee's e-mail soliciting business
from a company that the grievant's employer was also soliciting. 397 In
another, the arbitrator upheld the termination of an employee who had set
up an Internet website and purchased equipment to establish a directly
competing business. 398 These cases are consistent with arbitral decisions
that have found direct competition with one's employer to amount to a
sufficient harm to justify termination. 399
There are, however, limits as to what constitutes direct competition.
As noted by one arbitrator, "[flor competition to be substantively signifi-
cant it clearly must be more than minimal. One can arguably contend
that the corner delicatessen competes with the nearby supermarket; but
395 See Quaker Oats Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 211, 215 (2001) (Marino, Arb.) ("As
a general rule, arbitrators hold that an employer may not discipline an employee for off-duty
activities. Nevertheless, while agreeing that the private life of an employee is beyond the
reach of his employer, it must be pointed out that the effect of the conduct on an employee's
job relationship may prevail over consideration of privacy.").
396 See id. at 213; see also Dept. of Corr. Servs., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1536
(determining that the boundary between the employer's business interest and employee's pri-
vacy interests shift only where it can be shown there is a "nexus" between the off-duty behav-
ior and the employer's interests).
397 See GFC Crane Consultants Inc., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 801, 804 (2006)
(Abrams, Arb.).
398 See Fox Television Station, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 641, 645 (2003) (Allen, Arb.).
There is an entire body of common law governing the appropriateness of non-compete clauses,
which is a topic beyond the scope of this Article.
399 See Penn Window Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 298, 304 (2004) (Dissen, Arb.)
(indicating that employers can have a policy forbidding employees to work for a direct com-
petitor and can terminate employees who are aware of the policy but go against it); cf ATC/
Vancom of Las Vegas, L.P., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 836 (2003) (Block, Arb.) (upholding
termination of employees who advocated that city eliminate employer and run buses itself).
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one cannot logically or accurately conclude that such competition is any-
thing more than minimal. '400
Indeed, a stronger position could be taken. If employees are pro-
vided no rights to privacy or autonomy in the workplace, but rather
treated simply as a labor commodity, then they should be free to work
even for a competitor. By providing the labor, they have provided all
that the employer asks. If, however, employees are treated as partici-
pants in the success of the company, humanely, and with rights of pri-
vacy, then employers might expect loyalty from them, including the
loyalty not to undermine the company by working for a competitor.40'
One decision suggests that a concrete adverse effect on the em-
ployee's performance of his duties would also suffice whereas an impact
on office morale is not a significant enough harm.40 2 The grievant's af-
fair with a subordinate whom he recommended for promotion created an
appearance of impropriety and unfairness in the workplace but an inves-
tigation revealed no preferential treatment.40 3
Another decision suggests that a type of significant concrete harm is
when supervisors and their families "are targeted by employees' off-duty
conduct because of the supervisors' on-duty, work related actions," ren-
dering the supervisors unable to perform their jobs effectively. 4°4
Another category of recognized significant concrete harm is where a
role model engages in immoral and obscene conduct, drawing attention
from those in the workplace and community. 40 5 The grievant, a school
teacher, was terminated when his estranged wife posted obscene nude
photos of the grievant on MySpace, as well as two other websites, in
400 Copley Newspapers, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 310, 313 (1996) (Stallworth, Arb.).
401 This is consistent with the rationale. for rules against competition as summarized by
one employer. Working for a competitor "jeapordizes both the financial well being of the
Employer and the Employer's own ability to secure work for its employees .... " Penn
Window Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 300. The arbitrator explained that a skilled em-
ployee who worked for a new direct competitor provided the new company "the benefit of his
experience" learned at the old company and thereby "assisted" the new company "in establish-
ing a competitive local presence, to the obvious detriment of the Employer." Id. at 305.
402 See Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 897, 900 (202) (Levy, Arb.). But
see Quaker Oats Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 211 (2001) (Marino, Arb.) (suggesting in
dicta that an adverse impact on employee morale is a legitimate employer interest).
403 See Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 898.
404 Quaker Oats Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 211, 215 (2001) (Marino, Arb.).
405 See Warren City Bd. of Educ., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 532 (Skulina, Arb.) (hold-
ing that a high school teacher, who did not take reasonable steps to maintain custody and
control of obscene photographs of him and his wife, which she posted on websites accessible
to students, was discharged for just cause); see also Lake Washington Sch. Dist., 120 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1081, 1087 (2004) (Henner, Arb.) (suggesting that an employer can appro-
priately require a teacher with a record of complaints against him of unwarranted contact with
students to seek permission from employer before having unsupervised contact with students
outside of work).
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conjunction with "gross" write-ups. 40 6 Co-workers, children, parents,
the local newspaper, and the community became aware of the photos. 40 7
At least one child called a teacher in tears.40 8
The analysis conducted by the arbitrator was consistent with that
used in off-duty conduct cases which rely on situational privacy. The
arbitrator looked at the effect of the off-duty conduct on the employee's
ability to perform his job.4°9 The decision recognized that, at least in
such circumstances, an employee has some responsibility to keep off-
duty conduct private from those in the workplace. 410 The arbitrator rea-
soned that the grievant had been warned that his wife would likely make
the photos publicly available but had not taken measures to prevent her
from so doing.41' This category should, however, be given a restrictive
application because some might categorize unobjectionable behavior like
two men holding hands or kissing as immoral and obscene.
The most obvious type of significant concrete harm would be a fi-
nancial harm, such as paying for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
leave for an employee who was not actually using such leave.412 Indeed,
the potential harm of employees taking paid leave when not truly entitled
to it appears to give rise to a great amount of off-duty monitoring by
employers.
Another arbitrator concludes that potential damage to the com-
pany's reputation is a significant enough harm. The arbitrator suggests
that the proper factors to determine whether there is a direct relation be-
tween the off-duty conduct and the grievant's work are the following:
406 Warren City Bd. of Educ., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 535.
407 See id.
408 See id.
409 See id. at 536.
410 See id. at 535.
411 See id. The issue of a third party exposing an employee's private information to the
employer and others raises a host of interesting legal issues that are beyond the scope of this
paper. What level of action must an employee take to ensure private information remains
private? If despite taking such action, the information is disclosed to the employer, can the
employer properly act on the information?
412 One arbitrator proposes that termination for off-duty conduct is appropriate when an
employee violates a rule that is "reasonably" related "to the orderly, efficient, and safe opera-
tion of the employer's business" and the infraction impedes the employer's ability to "conduct
its operations profitably and in a business like manner." United Ass'n of Plumbers &
Steamfitters, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 710, 712 (2001) (Wolfson, Arb.). The employee
failed to disclose her divorce to her employer resulting in the employer erroneously paying for
benefits for her prior husband. The arbitrator concluded that her justifications including "her
state of mind, her desire for privacy and her emotions surrounding being divorced after thirty
years of marriage in a community where she and her ex-husband are well-known" were not the
type he could consider. Id. at 713. The standards used by the arbitrator are quite vague and do
not specifically address the concrete harm at issue in the case, a financial loss to the employer,
regardless of the overall profitability of the business. Additionally, the standards fail to prop-
erly factor in the employee's privacy interest.
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"the extent to which the business is affected (harm to the business);
whether the affect is reasonable or inevitable; whether the harm ad-
versely affects the employee's ability to perform his or her job; or
whether the conduct will lead other employees to refuse to work with the
offender." 413
The first and second factors appear to indicate, as discussed above,
that there should be a significant harm to the employer. The third and
fourth factors appear to be subsets of the types of potential harms. While
the third is a valid consideration, the fourth should require proof that
employees have actually refused to work with the employee.4 14 Other-
wise an employer can simply claim that employees may refuse to work,
and can, perhaps, even encourage employees to state they would refuse
to work.
Apparently, relying heavily on the company's reputation as an "all-
American" and "wholesome" company as well as the third factor, the
arbitrator concluded that because the employee was registered as a sex
offender on a state website, and would be for ten years, the public, cus-
tomers, and co-workers could all be expected to object to the un-
supervised delivery of products by the grievant. 415 The arbitrator
concluded, "[t]he type of crime is serious enough, and its unacceptability
to the public significant enough to justify the Grievant's termination. '416
Contrary to the decision, potential damage to a company's reputa-
tion should not constitute the type of significant concrete harm necessary
to discipline for off-duty conduct. Reputation is a nebulous concept, and
much conduct might potentially affect any organization's perception of
its image. Rather, some concrete harm such as customer complaints or
refusals to work with the employee should be required.
If, on the other hand, harm to reputation does suffice, it should be
narrowly limited, as this arbitrator suggests, to conviction for a crime
that is extremely unacceptable to the public and notice of which is more
413 The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ohio/Ky. Dayton Sales Ctr., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1489, 1498 (2005) (Paolucci, Arb.); cf Dept. of Corr. Sers., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1533, 1537 (1997) (Simmelkjaer, Arb.) (stating exceptions to the general rule are when em-
ployer proves the conduct either harms the business; has an adverse effect on the employee's
ability to perform the job; or leads other employees to refuse to work); The Admiral at the
Lake, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep (BNA) 19, 25 (2005) (Petersen, Arb.) (stating exceptions to the
general rule are when the employee's behavior 1) harms "the employer's reputation or prod-
uct;" 2) "renders the employee unable to perform his or her duties or appear at work;" or 3)
"leads to a refusal, reluctance, or inability of other employees to work with" the employee).
414 See Dept. of Corr. Servs., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1536 (holding statements that
co-workers were embarrassed by grievant's conduct of flying a Nazi flag were not sufficient to
prove they refused to work with him).
415 See The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ohio/Ky. Dayton Sales Ctr., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) at 1494, 1497.
416 Id. at 1498.
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readily available than through court documents, such as through a regis-
tered sex offender website designed for use by the public.
ii) Examples of Insufficient Harms
In addition to harm to office morale or reputation being insufficient,
other types of harm are recognized as being inadequately significant,
such as being late to work.417 In one case, an arbitrator implied that even
if the grievant's off-duty conduct of attending a dance bar was the true
reason for her tardiness, she could not be disciplined for the tardiness or
lying about it.418
Another type of harm that is not concrete enough is a potential ethi-
cal conflict. In one decision, newspaper sports-writers freelanced for
publications of the teams on which they reported. 4 19 The arbitrator de-
cided that it was not "sufficient for the employer to offer its fears or
concerns that the reading public may perceive a conflict of interest. 420
Instead, the employer would need concrete evidence that the freelancing
influenced the grievants' work or that the public had complained about
the grievants' lack of objectivity. 421
b. Monitoring Off-Duty Behavior 422
Three decisions illustrate the range of arbitral concern regarding
surveillance of off-duty behavior, which does not yet appear to be a criti-
cal issue for many arbitrators. 423 Generally, arbitrators rely on the safe-
guard of limiting discipline for off-duty conduct to the exclusion of other
417 See Shawnee County, Kan. 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1659 (2007) (Daly, Arb.).
418 See id.
419 See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1274 (2002) (Daly, Arb.).
420 Id. at 1279.
421 See id.
422 A related issue is whether employees should be required to report personal off-duty
information to employers. See United Ass'n of Plumbers & Steamfitters, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 710, 712 (2001) (Wolfson, Arb.). This topic is beyond the scope of the Article. But
requiring employees to report any outside business activity seems overly invasive. Cf Fox
Television Station, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. 641,646 (2003) (Allen, Arb.) (upholding rule requiring
employees to disclose any outside business activity). Additionally, it seems feasible to require
gathering of information related to off-duty conduct be held confidential, upon an employee's
request to do so, by only those who need to know the information to take necessary action.
Such action is analogous to the manner in which employers honor the confidentiality of job
applicants who request confidentiality from their current employers. For instance, in the case
of United Ass'n of Plumbers & Stearmfitters, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 710 (2001) (Wolfson,
Arb.), limiting the release of the information to the appropriate benefits personnel might have
avoided the situation where the grievant failed to report her divorce.
423 But see Lyondell Citgo Ref., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 364. No case reviewed
other than Lyondell dealt with generalized monitoring, without reasonable suspicion, of em-
ployees' off-duty conduct. Cases involving generalized monitoring of off-duty activity do not
arise or are settled prior to arbitration, likely because of the clear line between private off-duty
conduct and on-duty conduct in the union setting.
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appropriate safeguards. Some arbitrators require reasonable suspicion to
monitor, while others do not. Some consider whether the conduct is
"outdoors and in the open" and others consider whether the conduct is
"public," generally indicating that monitoring of activity within the pri-
vate home is inappropriate.
For instance, one arbitrator believes that even surreptitious off-duty
surveillance of a particular employee based on a reasonable suspicion of
work-related misconduct is appropriate if the surveillance takes place
"outdoors and in the open. '424 While such conduct may be a violation of
privacy, it is not "untoward. '425 In the case, an employee told his super-
visor he would be hunting over Thanksgiving week. When he called in
to use FMLA leave Thanksgiving week with the excuse that he had to
care for his sick wife, the employer hired a private investigator whose
surveillance films revealed the employee loading a truck and otherwise
preparing to go hunting. The arbitrator relied on the film to uphold the
employee's discharge. 426
In another case the arbitrator suggests that not all activity outside of
a home is public. The arbitrator concluded that the display of a Nazi flag
on a porch was not public when the house was "approximately 300 feet
off the main highway" and "surrounded by numerous trees. '427 The ar-
bitrator reasoned that to take a photo of the flag, the photographer either
stood on the private property or "used a long distance lens. '428 The arbi-
trator overturned the grievant's discharge because the grievant's conduct
was not directly related to his employment. 429
In a third case, an arbitrator's decision suggests that monitoring
without reasonable suspicion is justifiable. Because an employee used
255.33 hours of FMLA leave in less than a twelve month period, the
executive vice president of the employer decided to have an investigative
firm conduct surveillance of the employee's activities on a day he was
off on FMLA leave.430 The arbitrator concluded that the video of the
grievant performing yard work demonstrated that the grievant "had an
obvious impairment" and would have been unable to work for all but the
last hour and a half of his shift. 431 The vice president had previously
decided to terminate the grievant based on the private investigator's re-
424 See Interstate Brands Corp., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1580, 1582 (2005) (Skulina,
Arb.).
425 Id.
426 See id. at 1581.
427 Dept. of Corr. Servs., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1541.
428 Id.
429 See id. at 1542.
430 See Bud Indus. Inc., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 908, 909, 912 (Miles, Arb.). The
video revealed the grievant working in his yard, but he was not "limber" or "fast" and ap-
peared to be in an altered state. He "labored to pull" a rake across the lawn. Id. at 914.
431 Id.
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port without reviewing the video. 432 The arbitrator overturned the
termination.433
These arbitration decisions do not suggest a per se ban on employer
surveillance of off-duty conduct. Rather, the decisions indicate that any
such surveillance policy should comply with an appropriate minimal
floor. Any policy which sufficiently protects employees' right to privacy
should place severe restrictions on employer monitoring of off-duty con-
duct. Indeed, the arbitrators' reliance on the concept of the surveillance
being open and outdoors suggest that surveillance of an employee in-
doors, especially in the home, is inappropriate. Just as the privacy of the
home has been recognized as sacrosanct for Fourth Amendment privacy
inquiries, it should likewise be guaranteed a high level of privacy from
employers. People have an absolute right for tasks performed in the
home, such as consuming medication or undergoing medical procedures,
engaging in sexual activity, or keeping personal diaries, to remain private
from their employers. Employers are unlikely to need to monitor an em-
ployee's activity within the home to determine whether a violation of
sick leave, disability leave, or other work-related rules has occurred. The
only exception might be for monitoring an employee's use of the em-
ployer's own equipment, such as a computer, in the home.434
Additionally, restricting monitoring of private behavior, even if
outside or in the open is equally appropriate. The employer is likely
able, in most cases, to discern any violation of work rules without prying
into an employee's backyard or a romantic picnic in a deserted park. In
those limited cases where the employer cannot, due to the isolation of the
employee and his home, it is appropriate to place the burden of potential
loss on the employer rather than sacrifice the privacy of the majority of
working people.
Even when monitoring is of public off-duty behavior, additional
safeguards beyond limitations on discipline are appropriate. An em-
ployer should have a reasonable suspicion that the employee is engaging
in conduct that would cause a significant concrete harm to the employer.
Without such a rule, employers can randomly monitor employees' be-
havior without any basis for suspecting wrongdoing. 435 For instance, an
employer could monitor every employee who went on workers' compen-
sation leave or pry into non-work related, but potentially objectionable
432 See id. at 910.
433 See id. at 915.
434 See discussion infra Section VI.C.4.c.
435 This is similar to random drug testing protested by unions as an invasion of privacy.
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conduct, such as visits to the doctor, volunteer work at an AIDS/HIV
clinic, or a close friendship with a known convict.436
Additional safeguards for monitoring of off-duty conduct involve
many of those discussed in the previous sections. Because off-duty con-
duct is the most private, the package of protection afforded should in-
clude the most stringent combination of safeguards. In all instances,
other available means of verifying an infraction should be used prior to
monitoring. A confidential reviewer should perform the monitoring,
which should be limited to only behavior relevant to the purpose of the
monitoring. Only behavior that is in violation of the stated purpose of
the monitoring should be disclosed to management, even if other infrac-
tions are discovered. And that information should be disclosed only to
those with a need to know. Furthermore, compensation should be pro-
vided for the violation of the employee's privacy whether or not discipli-
nary action actually results.
In addition, an appropriate package of safeguards could include no-
tifying employees that the employer will monitor when it has a reasona-
ble suspicion of an infraction that would cause harm to the employer.
The notice should clearly delineate the types of infractions monitored for
and the potential resulting discipline, and should contain the particulars
of the types of monitoring that will take place. The policy should be
consistently enforced, and any discipline imposed should be mitigated by
the private nature of the conduct or communication.
Alternatively, the package of safeguards might include notifying the
employee that monitoring will begin after discovery of the potential in-
fraction and before a verification process. The employee should be in-
formed of the alleged infraction for which monitoring is taking place, the
potential resulting discipline, and the particulars of the type of monitor-
ing. The employer should consistently follow the procedure in every in-
stance that there is a reasonable suspicion of the type of infraction, so as
to avoid arbitrary off-duty monitoring.
Some may argue that employers should be able to monitor employ-
ees' conduct without reasonable suspicion when the monitoring involves
time that the employee is being paid while on leave. In such a situation,
the employer has a clear interest in ascertaining whether the employee is
actually using the leave for the granted purpose. The cost of malingering
can be high, and the employer has limited means, other than surveillance,
to discover malingering.
If such an exception is made, it should be a narrow one. The moni-
toring should be subject to a safeguard package, such as those two illus-
436 See Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 390 (2003) (noting that employees "have been discharged for associat-
ing with known criminals or their relatives").
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trated above, that provides a high level of privacy protection. The only
difference would be that the employer could engage in noticed-random
monitoring during normal working time. Yet, on the other hand, an em-
ployee is entitled to a certain amount of leave, proyided there is medical
or other proof, and should not be assumed to be malingering or dishonest
unless some reason indicates otherwise. Thus, such an exception is prob-
ably unwarranted in most situations.
c. Monitoring the Employer's Property on the Employee's
Property
As employees spend more time at home working with employer-
issued equipment, the issue of monitoring employer property that resides
on the employee's property becomes a salient one.437 One case suggests
that monitoring the property of an employer, such as an employer-owned
vehicle, is appropriate when it is at an employee's home during work-
time.4 38 The arbitrator reasoned that first-hand observation of an em-
ployee's company vehicle parked at the employee's home carried more
weight than GPS reports disclosing the same.439
In instances where an employer is monitoring the use of its own
equipment, such as a computer or vehicle, then an exception to the rule
permitting no monitoring inside or in private areas is permissible. Work
equipment should be used, generally, for work, and the same concerns of
misuse of equipment exist even when the equipment is on the em-
ployee's property. Thus, a package of safeguards such as that discussed
for surveillance of on-duty communications should suffice to protect the
employee's privacy. The employer should not, however, be permitted to
use its equipment to monitor the employee's behavior unrelated to use of
the equipment. For example, an employer could not have the computer
tapping into an employee's conversations in her house or have a GPS
monitoring where she was moving about in her home.
437 Another important issue with the accessibility of new communications technology is
that of the employee using personal equipment at work. Two arbitration cases reviewed raise
the issue of searching employees' equipment located on employer property. See Trane Co.,
124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 677; U.S. Steel Corp., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1557, 1559
(2005) (Bethel, Arb.) (concluding that collective bargaining agreement precluded employer
from threatening to discipline employees who refused to consent to a random search of vehi-
cles in company parking lot). In contrast to employer equipment, which is generally used for
work, personal equipment is generally used for personal reasons. Thus, safeguards like those
proposed for off-duty conduct would be appropriate as to the employer's monitoring of per-
sonal equipment.
438 See Beverage Mktg. Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1388, 1391 (2005) (Fagan, Arb.).
439 See id. at 1389.
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D. Adequate Remedies for Violation of Protections Should Include
the Safeguards Suggested by the Arbitration Decisions and
Additional Sanctions
As previously discussed, adequate protections might be imple-
mented through minimum standards or safe-harbor policies, or some
other creative means. Whatever the source of the protection, there must
be significant consequences for employers who proceed without the re-
quired safeguards and an adequate remedy for the employee whose pri-
vacy is violated in order for the protection to be effective. Several of the
safeguards work equally well as remedies. First, whenever an employer
acts in a manner that contravenes the applicable policy, the employee
who is aware of the monitoring should have the right to affirmatively
refuse the invasion.440 Second, whenever the policy does not provide
compensation as a safeguard, compensation for the invasion of privacy
can serve as an effective remedy. Third, the concept of mitigating disci-
pline based on the right to privacy can be extended, when not provided
for in the policy, to serve as a remedy for policy violations. Finally, in
all cases, removal of any discipline imposed as a result of monitoring
outside the scope of the policy can serve as an effective remedy.
Additionally, administrative fines or similar penalties could be used
as an appropriate remedy. 441 If use of an attorney is contemplated as part
of the enforcement scheme, then payment of attorneys' fees would also
be an appropriate remedy.
E. Some Level of Privacy Protection Must Be a Nonwaivable Right
When protections are provided for employees' right to privacy,
whether the individual employee should be able to exchange the right of
privacy from employer monitoring for additional compensation is likely
to become a contentious issue. Several factors suggest that the right
should be nonwaivable. 442 The right is a fundamental one to which em-
ployees are entitled regardless of their level of personal wealth. Addi-
tionally, the unequal bargaining position of employees and employers
means that employees might agree to compensation in lieu of privacy
when they would actually prefer the latter.
Other considerations, however, weigh in favor of permitting such an
exchange. Certain employees are salaried precisely because they are ex-
pected to be available at varying hours in return for salaried compensa-
440 At a minimum, this remedy should be available for attempted invasions of personal
computer use and off-duty activity. See supra Section VH.C. I.
441 French law imposes fines for failing to adequately notify employees of electronic
monitoring. Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 30, at 892.
442 This is similar to the way in which an employee cannot waive the right to mandated
breaks in exchange for more compensation.
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tion. Other employees such as doctors, especially in certain specialties,
may be needed urgently by their employers and patients with little notice
at any time of the day.
Additionally, whether an exchange is permissible might be a result
not only of the type of employee at issue but also of the type and extent
of monitoring at issue. Trading compensation in return for wearing a
pager on certain days seems less invasive of an employee's privacy than
trading compensation for twenty-four hour remote monitoring of her per-
sonal home computer. A workable policy would set a floor of privacy
rights which an employee could not trade away based on the general type
and extent of monitoring; it would also differentiate between types of
employees.
CONCLUSION
Almost one hundred twenty years ago, Louis D. Brandeis urged that
technological change necessitated protection of the right to privacy. 443
Justice Brandeis was also astutely aware of the extensive power of cor-
porations, including the power to "subject labor to capital" and infringe
employees' "liberties and opportunities." 444 It is all too poignant then
that the common law protection for which his article was the impetus has
generally failed to protect employees' right to privacy.
The introduction of recent technology such as GPS, e-mail, and
blogging has rendered this failure more acute. This Article proposes a
solution: protection for employee privacy from technological monitoring
based on the safeguards recognized by labor arbitrators. Indeed, the law
of the shop is one of the few places in America that workplace privacy
has been recognized. While the protection is neither as systematic nor
robust as would be ideal, the safeguards suggested by the decisions can
serve as a starting point for developing an adequate framework of protec-
tion. Thus, by surveying recent arbitration decisions dealing with pri-
vacy, GPS, e-mail, blogging, and the Internet, this Article fills a gap in
the literature.
443 See Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
444 See Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The preva-
lence of the corporation in America has led men of this generation . . .to accept the evils
attendant upon the free and unrestricted use of the corporate mechanism as if these evils were
the inescapable price of civilized life and, hence, to be home with resignation. Throughout the
greater part of our history a different view prevailed. Although the value of this instrumental-
ity in commerce and industry was fully recognized, incorporation for business was commonly
denied long after it had been freely granted for religious, educational and charitable purposes.
It was denied because of fear. Fear of encroachment upon the liberties and opportunities of the
individual. Fear of the subjection of labor to capital.").
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But more remains to be done. Useful concepts and ideas would
likely also be disclosed by other sources that reflect the law of the shop,
such as court decisions and unpublished arbitration decisions. Review of
collective bargaining agreements and corporate privacy policies in the
union sector may provide additional insight.
Additionally, a legal scholar who cherishes the right to privacy
might conduct a case study of a union workplace and its employees.
Such a study might provide insight on the details of effective implemen-
tation of privacy safeguards. It would also, doubtless, provide insight on
the human need for privacy-even in the workplace.
